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INTRODUCTION: EMERGING ROLE OF THE BRIC COUNTRIES

The precise connection between intellectual property and
economic development varies over time from country to country
1
and region to region. For example, one cannot doubt that
intellectual property laws played a major role in the United
States’ development and economic growth over the past three
1.
See, e.g., Meir Pugatch, The Process of Intellectual Property Policy-Making in the
21st Century—Shifting from a General Welfare Model to a Multi-Dimensional One, 31
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 307 (2009). See generally KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 2–3 (2000); MEIR P. PUGATCH, STOCKHOLM
NETWORK, IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT: A DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE BENEFITS OF THE
VOLUNTARY MARKET-DRIVEN APPROACH TO INNOVATION (2008) (“[I]nnovation both
influences, and is influenced by, a number of exogenous or external factors—social,
cultural and demographic trends, for example.”).
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decades. Yet, the moment one digs deeper, one discovers that,
until 1982, the United States had one of the developed world’s
most pro-competitive patent laws (i.e., least protective); until
1978, it had relatively weak copyright laws; and until the 1980s,
it had an aggressively interventionist competition law along with
2
a robust doctrine of patent misuse. Somehow, the U.S. economy
managed to survive and thrive in this relatively low
protectionist, highly competitive environment.
Similarly, Japan, India, China, Korea, Malaysia, and Brazil
all managed to attain relatively high levels of economic growth
3
without strong intellectual property rights. The astounding
success of the Indian pharmaceutical industry that began in the
1970s was achieved by means of a state policy that largely
4
prohibited the patenting of medicinal products as such. This
phenomenon reminds us that intellectual property rights are but
one component of overall economic growth; that different states
have different factor endowments; and that in many countries,
especially those at an early stage of development, a sound
agricultural policy or a sound pro-competitive industrial policy
with a supportive political and legal infrastructure are more
likely to stimulate economic growth than intellectual property
5
laws.
At the same time, we may confidently agree that countries
such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Argentina, Russia, South Africa, and many other emerging
economies will not reach their full economic potential without
2.
See CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
CRITICAL HISTORY 139–42 (2006); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33,
37–40; Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge
Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME
(K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman eds., 2005); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Intellectual
Property–Antitrust Interface, in 3 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1979, 1980–86
(Wayne D. Collins ed., 2008) (examining the historic interplay between antitrust and
intellectual property law and policy).
3.
See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other
Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual Property and
Intellectual Property Lawmaking 2–4, 11 (Int’l Law & Justice Working Paper 2009/5,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785 (suggesting that some developing
countries are now in a unique position to exercise their increasing influence to advance
“pro-access views” and “contribute to the harmonization and integration” of international
intellectual property norms).
4.
See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case Study of
TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009).
5.
See Daniel Gervais, Of Clusters and Assumptions: Innovation as Part of a Full
TRIPS Implementation, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2353, 2371 (2009).
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For example,
suitable intellectual property regimes.
policymakers in most Asian countries that are already
committed to becoming players in the knowledge economy
clearly understand they will not reach the frontiers of that
7
economy, nor will they convert their economies’ intangible,
nonrivalrous outputs into tradeable knowledge goods, without
articulating appropriate intellectual property laws and policies,
along with a whole set of interrelated economic and political
foundations that are essential to maintaining a viable post8
industrial economy. To this end, China’s third amendment of
its Patent Law in 2008 expressly reflects “the needs of
development of China herself,” which require “the promotion
of . . . independent innovation and the establishment of an
9
innovation-oriented country.”
The moment one looks at Asia as a regional group, one is
struck by how much the IP scenario has changed over the past
twenty-five years, i.e., since the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries began to press for
higher, relatively harmonized worldwide IP standards under the
10
aegis of what eventually became the TRIPS Agreement of 1994.
As many critics have observed, the TRIPS Agreement produced a
regime that deliberately favored those OECD countries that

6.
7.

See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 6, 11; Gervais, supra note 5, at 2360–61.
UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), TOWARDS
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETIES 27–56 (2005) [hereinafter TOWARDS KNOWLEDGE SOCIETIES]; see
also Mary-Louise Kearney, UNESCO, Research in the Knowledge Society: Global and
Local Dimensions, Concept Paper for the International Experts Workshop (Mar. 19–21,
2009), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001821/182189e.pdf (discussing
the benefits of and obstacles to obtaining access to knowledge in developing countries).
8.
See generally Daniel Gervais, TRIPS and Development, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2007); Peter Yu,
Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 173, 195.
9.
Xiaoqing Feng, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent
Innovation and Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law
of the P.R. China, U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2009, at 1, 6; see also Andrea
Wechsler, Intellectual Property in the P.R. China: A Powerful Economic Tool for Innovation
and Development 42 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop., Competition & Tax Law,
Research Paper No. 09-02, 2008) (“China continues to realize the importance of both the
unhampered influx of knowledge and intellectual property into China and the promotion of
domestic innovation . . . [and] it has come to embed its IP policy into the framework of an
overall pro-innovation industrial policy which protects domestic S&T innovations.”).
10.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement]. See generally Jerome H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of
Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 23 (Carlos
M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008).
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already possessed developed national systems of innovation and
whose multinational companies owned plenty of patented high11
tech products to sell or manufacture around the world. There
was a built-in disposition to favor big companies seeking rents
from existing innovations—or those in the pipeline—at the cost of
making future innovations more difficult, especially for less
12
technically advanced countries.
Robert Ostergard recently described the “development
dilemma” that TRIPS posed for poorer countries in the following
terms:
[I]f they open their domestic markets to trade, they face
political and economic pressure to protect foreign IP; if they
protect foreign IP, they create conditions that force them to
abandon their goal to obtain IP as inexpensively as
13
possible.
Of course, these IP concessions were partly offset by trade
concessions in other areas (side payments), such as textiles,
agriculture, and traditionally manufactured goods, a calculus
that worked differently for different countries.
Yet, as often happens in international law, efforts to rig a
regime for short-term advantages may turn out, in the mediumand long-term, to boomerang against those who pressed hardest
for its adoption. In my very first article on this subject, I warned
that by reaching for high levels of international protection (that
could not change in response to less-favorable domestic
circumstances), technology-exporting countries risked fostering
conditions that could erode their technological superiority and
14
resulting terms of trade over time. As more technologyimporting countries discovered and cultivated their own

11.
12.

See, e.g., MAY & SELL, supra note 2, at 187; Gervais, supra note 5, at 2357–58.
See PETER DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO
OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 125–26 (2002); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a
Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 94–96 (2007) (reasoning that high rents
charged by technology exporters hamper developing countries’ abilities to preserve their
own comparative advantages).
13.
Robert L. Ostergard, Jr., Economic Growth and Intellectual Property Rights
Protection: A Reassessment of the Conventional Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 115, 155.
14.
J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and
Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747, 891 (1989). For evidence
that this inversion is occurring within the Indian pharmaceutical industry, see
Kapczynski, supra note 4 (noting that, instead of pushing Indian competitors out of the
low-value Indian markets, multilateral pharmaceutical firms “may have also pushed
Indian companies into the U.S. and EU markets on which their profits much more
substantially rely”).
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innovative strengths and capacities, they would benefit both
from the worldwide system of incentives and protections that
the TRIPS Agreement had established, as well as from location
15
and other endowment factors, at the expense of leading
developed countries that took their own technical superiority for
granted.
In short, given the “incipient transnational system of
16
innovation” that had begun to emerge from the TRIPS
Agreement, there was every reason to expect that the BRIC
17
group as a whole, and many other emerging economies, would
gradually become major competitors in the knowledge economy
itself, with growing potential to match and challenge the
advanced OECD countries’ pre-existing comparative advantages
18
in this area.
That this transformation has been occurring all around us is
19
too solidly evidenced for us to review here in detail. What this
Article will focus on, instead, is how those developing countries
with growing technological prowess should accommodate their
own national systems of innovation to the worldwide intellectual
property regime emerging in the post-TRIPS period, with a view
20
to maximizing global economic welfare in the foreseeable future.
II. AVOIDING PROTECTIONIST EXCESSES
High-protectionist visions of intellectual property law have
become a kind of latter-day religion promoted by the special
interests that have long dominated the political scene in the
21
United States, the European Union (EU), and Japan. The BRIC
15.
See Yu, supra note 8, at 176–79.
16.
Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 44.
17.
“BRIC” refers to those developing countries with fast-growing economies,
especially Brazil, Russia, India, and China. See Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman,
Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050, at 3 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No.
99, 2003), available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf.
18.
Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 44; see also Jerome H. Reichman, Richard
Lillich Memorial Lecture: Nurturing a Transnational System of Innovation, 16 J.
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 143, 147–48 (2007).
19.
See Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus, Why We Study Intellectual Property
Rights and What We Have Learned, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 7–
8 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005); Wechsler, supra note 9 (case of China);
Ricardo Machado Ruiz, Technological Leadership and Market Leadership: Expected
Convergences or Structural Differences?, Paper Presented at the International Seminar
INCT-PPED: Promoting Strategic Responses to Globalization, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Nov.
5, 2009) (case of Brazil).
20.
See Gervais, supra note 5, at 2361–71 (emphasizing adaptation problems of
national systems of innovation and citing authorities).
21.
See, e.g., DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 11–12; MICHAEL P.
RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY 85–89 (1998) (noting the influence of special interest
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countries in particular will thus need to inoculate themselves
against succumbing to these same high-protectionist delusions
while there is still time.
If it remains true that a country cannot play in the
knowledge economy without suitable intellectual property rights
22
(IPRs), experience in many OECD countries is demonstrating
that badly configured, unbalanced, over-protectionist IP regimes
gradually stifle innovation by making inputs to future innovation
23
too costly and too cumbersome to sustain over time. Such
regimes also enable large corporations that are sometimes
slothful innovators to accumulate pools of cross-licensed patents
that create barriers to entry for the truly innovative small- and
24
medium-sized firms. Properly designed IPRs do, however,
protect innovative small- and medium-sized firms from the
predatory practices of their larger competitors.
It is widely recognized that the patent system in the United
States is emerging from a period of crisis. Among other problems,
the cumulative costs of litigation generated by a plethora of weak
patents that increasingly pervaded the upstream research
dimension threaten to exceed the aggregate returns from
patented innovation as such, especially in the field of information
25
technologies. There is still no consensus about how to reform the
groups on U.S. bilateral intellectual property diplomacy and citing specific examples). But
see generally EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE (2007) (evaluating
four competing scenarios for the evolution of patent law regimes with very different and
conflicting premises and outcomes).
22.
See Gervais, supra note 8, at 33–36; Wechsler, supra note 9, at 42–43
(stressing that China’s new patent law was not the outcome of external pressure but
was intended “to allow China’s domestic firms to compete effectively with their foreign
counterparts”).
23.
See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 218 (2008) (describing the
prohibitive costs of obtaining and litigating patents); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND 113 (2008); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12,
at 102–08; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, Empowering Digitally
Integrated Scientific Research: The Pivotal Role of Copyright Law’s Limitations and
Exceptions 9–10 (Draft Version May 4, 2009), Paper Presented at the Fordham
Conference on Intellectual Property Law and Policy, Cambridge University (Apr. 15,
2009); at the UNCTAD/ICTSD side event, Meeting of the Committee on Copyrights and
Neighboring Rights, World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, Switzerland (May
29, 2009); and at the Meeting of the Task Force on Intellectual Property Rights and
Development (IDP), University of Manchester (June 22–23, 2009).
24.
See, e.g., Geertrui van Overwalle, Of Thickets, Blocks and Gaps. Designing Tools
to Resolve Obstacles in the Gene Patents Landscape, in GENE PATENTS AND
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 383 (Geertrui van Overwalle ed., 2009); Carl Shapiro,
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 119, 130–31 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
25.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 218; MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK
ECONOMY 52–53 (2008); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
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patent system, despite broad agreement that reforms are needed.
As time passes, the demands of different industries become more
contradictory and conflictual, particularly with regard to the
26
information technology and biotechnology sectors. For these and
other reasons, the European Patent Office has expressed concerns
27
about the uncertain future of the world patent system.
None of these domestic tensions deterred either the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) or the European
Commission (EC) from demanding that the rest of the world
adopt a proposed Substantive Patent Law Treaty that, at the
international level, would have locked in place most of the very
unsolved problems that confront the domestic system of
28
innovation in the United States. The rest of the world might
logically ask which version of U.S. patent law the USTR now
seeks to export, given that the U.S. Supreme Court has so
29
profoundly changed it in a series of recent cases. By the same
token, one may also ask why certain Asian patent offices
blindly supported these same proposals for a further upward
DISCONTENTS 4–5 (2004). Studies by the Federal Trade Commission and the National
Academy of Sciences have also confirmed the diminishing returns that an unbalanced
patent system has been producing in the United States. HELLER, supra, at 65.
26.
Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 103–04.
27.
See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 21, at 8–11 (evaluating four
competing scenarios for the evolution of patent law regimes with very different and
conflicting premises and outcomes); see also Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent
Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515 (2003).
28.
See, e.g., World Intell. Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Comm. on the Law of
Patents, Report, at 4–5, 19–21, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/11 (June 1, 2005); WIPO, Standing
Comm. on the Law of Patents, Information on Certain Recent Developments in Relation to
the Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT), at 1–3, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/8 (Mar. 17,
2004) (discussing the efforts of the standing committee to draft a Substantive Patent Law
Treaty that can be quickly adopted and later supplemented once consensus is reached on
controversial provisions).
29.
See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 (2008)
(holding that the doctrine of patent exhaustion applies to the sale of components of a
patented system); MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 124–25 (2007)
(holding that a patent licensee does not have to terminate its license agreement before it
can seek a declaratory judgment that the patent is invalid); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 426–28 (2007) (expanding the rules governing the inquiry into whether a
patent claim is “obvious” in light of prior art, admonishing that such an analysis “must
not be confined within a test or formulation too constrained to serve its purpose”);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441–43 (2007) (holding that patent
infringement occurs when one supplies a patented invention’s components from the
United States and the product is reproduced; however, this rule does not apply to
software exported but not installed overseas); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (holding that the generally applicable four-factor test for permanent
injunctive relief applies to disputes arising under Patent Act); see also In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct.
2735 (2009) (holding the machine-or-transformation test to be the applicable test for
determining patent eligibility of process claims in business method patent
applications).
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ratcheting of international patent norms. It was as if their
governments were asking the other OECD countries, “Please
give us all your insoluble problems and contradictions as soon
as possible, so we can undermine our own national systems of
30
innovation, too.”
Of course, the more that high- and middle-income developing
countries become players in the knowledge economy, the more
they share some of the fears and risks that usually underlie
demands for higher levels of protection by powerful sectors of the
advanced technology-exporting countries. For example, Asian
entrepreneurs want their own exports of knowledge goods
protected in the developing countries whose markets they
increasingly penetrate through foreign direct investment (FDI),
licensing, or sales of high-tech products. They also want to
maintain flows of FDI and market-driven technology transfer
into their own countries, in order to bolster their growing
technological capacities.
Yet, such concerns do not necessarily add up to a compelling
case for higher levels of international intellectual property
protection. On the contrary, the TRIPS Agreement itself provided
an unprecedented platform of IP protection for exports after
31
2000, and there is little evidence that this platform remains
insufficient for the needs of Asian exporters, or for those of other
emerging economies for the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, the
relation between FDI and IPRs itself remains ambiguous, given
that OECD technology exporters need entry into emerging
economies as much as these economies need FDI and market32
driven technology transfer from the OECD countries.

30.
For the view that “transnational legal culture” may link developing country
patent offices into epistemic communities detached from broader policy considerations,
see Kapczynski, supra note 4. See also CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME
314–20 (2009) (studying the sources of the wide variation found in developing countries’
use of TRIPS flexibilities and intellectual property enforcement in general).
31.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 65.2 (setting the year 2000 as the end
of the transition period for developing countries). For pharmaceuticals, the effective
transition period ended in 2005. Id. art. 65.4. For some of the thirty-two least-developed
countries, the transition period for patents in general need not end until 2013 and for
pharmaceuticals, until 2016. Id. art. 66.1; World Trade Organization, Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 20, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 755
(2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health Declaration]; Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with
Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 (July 1, 2002); Council for Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the Transition Period under Article
66.1 for Least-Developed Country Members, IP/C/40 (Nov. 30, 2005).
32.
See Yu, supra note 8, at 177–80 (emphasizing that stronger IP protection may
not be necessary to attract FDI for countries that possess large and dynamic markets).
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In China, India, and Brazil, moreover, knowledge economy
skills and capacities have apparently reached the point where the
stimulating effects of IPRs will influence different sectors and
stakeholders quite differently, depending on the extent to which
they are still driven by imitation-related innovation or
33
investments in basic, or at least relatively original, R&D.
Increasingly, tensions arise between those who demand relatively
strong patent protection for, say, research-driven pharmaceuticals,
and those who demand a more forgiving, pro-competitive approach
34
favoring generic pharmaceutical producers and exporters. In
either case, how to protect cumulative and sequential innovation—
as distinct from path-breaking innovation—becomes an ever more
pressing problem as more small- and medium-sized firms acquire
35
a taste and capacity for such innovation.
A parallel set of problems that the BRIC countries and other
emerging economies increasingly face is how to adjust the
shifting relations between private and public goods. Education,
public health, agricultural improvement, scientific research, and
other important areas are still heavily dependent on the public
sector in most of these countries. Yet international intellectual
36
property rights may impede the acquisition of scientific and
37
38
educational materials; essential medicines; and seeds, stocks,
33.
See, e.g., id. at 181–84 (discussing the relationship between FDI and IPRs in
China’s economic system); Kapczynski, supra note 4 (case of Indian pharmaceutical
industries); Machado Ruiz, supra note 19; see also Pedro Nicoletti Mizukami & Ronaldo
Lemos, From Free Software to Free Culture: The Emergence of Open Business, in ACCESS
TO KNOWLEDGE IN BRAZIL 25, 29–32 (Lea Shaver ed., 2008) (describing the relationship
between FDI and IPRs in Brazil’s economic system).
34.
See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous
Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 539–41 (2007) (noting the divergent views of the
pharmaceutical companies in India).
35.
See, e.g., Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 118–20.
36.
See, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 29–30 (arguing that broad
exceptions for scientific uses are needed under current IP rules); J.H. Reichman & Paul F.
Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly
Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 315, 461–62; Jacques Warcoin, ‘Patent Tsunami’ in the Field of Genetic
Diagnostics. A Patent Practitioner’s View, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE
LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 331. See generally BOYLE, supra note 23.
37.
Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “from Below”: Copyright and Capability
for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 821–29 (2007); Ruth L. Okediji, Sustainable
Access to Copyrighted Digital Information Works in Developing Countries, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 142, 184–85.
38.
Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 928 (2007); Kevin Outterson,
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription
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and fertilizers needed for economic growth. The extent to which
these same types of impediments will adversely affect the
development and dissemination of environmental technologies
40
still remains to be seen.
Even with regard to the role of public-sector investment in
basic research, which has been crucial in the most developed
countries, there remains great uncertainty about the kind of
regulatory regimes needed to ensure an appropriate social return
41
from publicly funded or publicly generated research initiatives.
III. DESIGNING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
As the high- and middle-income developing countries seek to
strengthen their own national systems of innovation, they must
decide how to address the challenges posed by a now highly
articulated worldwide intellectual property system. This task
requires policy decisions affecting the growth of a knowledge
economy, rather than an economy based on physical, capital, or
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 193 (2005).
39.
Michael Blakeney, Stimulating Agricultural Innovation, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 367, 381; Robert E. Evenson, Agricultural Research and
Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 188,
212–13; Timothy Swanson & Timo Goeschl, Diffusion and Distribution: The Impacts on Poor
Countries of Technological Enforcement Within the Biotechnology Sector, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 669, 674–75; see also Michael Halewood, Agriculture and
the Global Crop Commons, Paper Presented at the Task Force on Intellectual Property
Rights and Development, Manchester, United Kingdom (June 23, 2009).
40.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Innovation and Technology Transfer to Address
Climate Change: Lessons from the Global Debate on Intellectual Property and Public
Health 27–28 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 24, 2009),
available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/innovation-and-technology-transfer-toaddress-climate-change.pdf; Jerome Reichman, Arti K. Rai, Richard G. Newell &
Jonathan B. Wiener, Intellectual Property and Alternatives: Strategies for Green
Innovation 7–8 (Chatham House Energy, Env’t & Dev. Program Paper, Preliminary
Working Paper No. 08/03, 2008); Keith E. Maskus & Ruth L. Okediji, Intellectual
Property Rights and International Technology Transfer to Address Climate Change:
Risks, Opportunities, and Policy Options 16–17 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Houston Law Review).
41.
See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries:
Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (United Nations
Conference on Trade & Dev., Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Policy Brief No. 5,
2009); Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from
the US Experience, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2078, 2080–82 (2008); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289, 313–14 (arguing that funding agencies should be
given more authority over universities to restrict patenting of publicly funded
research).
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natural resources, which have relatively little to do with
42
intellectual property laws as such.
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an
ancillary but important role, there are, roughly speaking, two
different approaches on the table. One is to play it safe by
sticking to time-tested IP solutions implemented in OECD
countries, with perhaps a relatively greater emphasis on the
flexibilities still permitted under TRIPS (and not overridden by
43
relevant FTAs). The other approach is to embark upon a more
innovative and even experimental path, with a view to addressing
and perhaps solving the very problems that the advanced
44
technology-exporting countries currently find so daunting.
A. From “Fair Followers” to “Counter-Harmonization”

45

Most technical assistance experts and many academics take
the view that developing countries should stick to time-tested IP
solutions while exploiting available exceptions and limitations
recognized by developed countries. This approach affords the
advantages of requiring relatively modest lawyering inputs
(although it still requires more lawyering than one might
46
think ); it may reduce internal debate about appropriate
solutions; and it may deflect political and economic pressures
from powerful countries whose own prior practices cast a

42.
See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 5, at 2361–71 (discussing strategies for research
and education for the clustering or networking of centers of innovation, for steering
innovation in suitable directions, for inculcating social norms conducive to innovation,
and for a suitable regulatory infrastructure); Leonardo Burlamaqui, IPRs and
Development Policy: From Intellectual Property to Knowledge Governance, Paper
Presented at the International Seminar INCT-PPED: Promoting Strategic Responses to
Globalization, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (Nov. 5, 2009).
43.
See Daniel J. Gervais, Epilogue: A TRIPS Implementation Toolbox, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 527, 529–30; J.H.
Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 11, 13–16 (1997) (recommending strategies for
developing and developed countries to implement TRIPS differently); see also DEERE,
supra note 30, at 2.
44.
See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 93, 102–08; see also John F. Duffy,
Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 691–92
(2002). The notion of nation states as conductors of experimental IP laboratories goes
back to Stephen Ladas’s discussion of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (1883). See 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
RELATED RIGHTS 9–13 (1975).
45.
Professor Kapczynski has coined the felicitous term, “Counter-Harmonization,”
which I gratefully adopt here. See Kapczynski, supra note 4.
46.
See Gervais, supra note 43, at 529–31 (providing examples of bilateral
agreements that, while adopting TRIPS norms, require nation-specific variations);
Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus Protection and Impacts in Latin America, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 221, 225.
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47

comforting shadow.
While this strategy seems politically expedient, Professor
Dreyfuss and I remain skeptical for one main reason. At the end
of the day, discreetly following in the technology-exporting
countries’ IP footsteps will merely bring the high- and middleincome developing countries face to face with the serious
problems that the OECD countries have themselves failed to
solve. It will place everyone in an equally unsatisfactory position,
without having enhanced the governance skills of developing
countries and without enriching the incipient transnational
system of innovation with much-needed empirical evidence about
alternative IP solutions to an array of apparently intractable
problems. A deliberate policy of “counter-harmonization,”
instead, could “reduce the collective administrative costs of
adopting an alternative patent regime, create a transnational
‘counter-culture,’ and increase the costs . . . of extralegal
48
retaliation.”
Consider, for example, the choking and blocking effects that
a proliferation of patents rooted in low nonobviousness standards
increasingly produced for the software and, arguably, biotech
49
industries in the United States and elsewhere.
This
phenomenon elicits pressures for “quality patents” that would

47.
Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of
Effective International Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in
the Andean Community, 103 AMER. J. INT’L L. 1, 16–36 (2009) (evidencing intense IP
pressures on Latin American countries and collective response by the Andean Group);
Robert C. Bird, Developing Nations and the Compulsory License: Maximizing Access to
Essential Medicines While Minimizing Investment Side Effects, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
209, 219 (2009) (stressing retaliatory pressures on developing countries that adopt
compulsory licensing schemes in order to maximize public health benefits under current
IP regimes).
48.
Kapczynski, supra note 4; see also Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 121.
Professor Gervais observes that “many developing countries also want a system that is
simpler than some of the doctrines” in more technologically advanced countries, although
he concedes that complexity is less of a problem for BRIC countries and other emerging
economies. E-mail from Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law
School, to Jerome Reichman, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law (Sept. 14,
2009) (on file with Author).
49.
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem?
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1079 (2008)
(evaluating the argument that upstream patents may prevent projects in the biomedical
field from getting off the ground); M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998)
(recognizing the increased cost associated with bundling patent licenses together); Arti K.
Rai, John R. Allison & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Software Ownership and Litigation:
A First Examination, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1519, 1554 (2009) (arguing that certain universityowned patents allowed the right holders to “extract rents and perhaps even holdup
development efforts”); see also Warcoin, supra note 36, at 331, 332–33.
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presumably result from higher nonobviousness standards, and
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently taken a first step in this
51
52
direction, pending further legislative reforms on the table. But
higher nonobviousness standards, without more, will also expose
costly cumulative and sequential innovation to free-riding forms
of market failure, which was the risk that induced the Federal
53
Circuit to lower its nonobviousness standard in the first place.
From this perspective, both the U.S. and foreign experiences
reveal a cyclical or pendular shifting between states of under54
and over-protection, without policymakers ever having seriously
addressed the underlying question of how appropriately to
protect cumulative and sequential innovation at the core of much
55
present-day technological progress. This same question has now
56
begun to surface in countries such as India and China. For

50.
See, e.g., HELLER, supra note 25, at 65 (outlining the Federal Trade Commission
and National Academy of Sciences’s recommendation for reforming and strengthening
nonobviousness standards).
51.
See id. at 65–66 (“[T]he Court raised the bar for ‘obviousness’ . . . and reduced
the ease with which patent holders can threaten other innovators with business-killing
injunctions.” (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007))); see also In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (revising eligibility criteria for business method patents).
52.
Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong.; Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R.
1260, 111th Cong. However, legislative efforts to further refine the nonobviousness
standard are no longer apparent in the pending bills, after the Supreme Court’s decision
in KSR. See generally Jay Thomas, Keynote Address at the Seventh Annual Hot Topics in
Intellectual Property Law Symposium, Duke University School of Law, Durham, North
Carolina: Progressive Patent Policy in the Post-Reform Era (Feb. 29, 2008).
53.
See J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1772–76 (2000); see also Douglas Gary
Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 MINN. L. REV.
693 (1997) (demonstrating difficulties of recouping development costs under current
competitive conditions).
54.
J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2519 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Hybrids]; J.H. Reichman,
Charting the Collapse of the Patent–Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured
International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 515 (1995).
55.
See J.H. Reichman, Saving the Patent Law from Itself: Informal Remarks
Concerning the Systemic Problems Afflicting Developed Intellectual Property Regimes, in
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 289, 295–301 (F.
Scott Kieff & John M. Olin eds., 2003) (suggesting that an alternative set of liability rules
that requires second-comers to compensate first-comer improvers is necessary to protect
cumulative innovation).
56.
Janice M. Mueller, Biotechnology Patenting in India: Will Bio-Generics Lead a
“Sunrise” Industry to Bio-Innovation?, 76 UMKC L. REV. 437, 446 (2007) (detailing India’s
efforts to promote biotechnology research through intellectual property protection,
including the creation of a Biotechnology Patent Facilitating Cell aimed at facilitating the
filing of patent applications); Janice M. Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India—Novartis,
Patent Law, and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 542 (2007) [hereinafter
Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India] (highlighting increased patent protection measures
taken by India since becoming a WTO member and resulting concerns); R.A. MASHELKAR
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example, efforts to codify a relatively stiff standard of
nonobviousness in the new Indian patent law were selfconsciously aimed at freeing up space for India’s thriving generic
57
pharmaceutical industry. But these same efforts elicited
complaints that India’s adoption of stiff eligibility standards
would deprive the more research-driven pharmaceutical sector of
sufficient incentives to invest in derivative applications of
58
medicines initially developed abroad.
Besides an appropriately selective nonobviousness standard,
in other words, India and similarly situated developing countries
need an appropriately designed domestic regime that stimulates
investment in cumulative and sequential innovation. Such a
regime must also avoid creating barriers to entry or unduly
hindering the transformation of today’s technological outputs
59
into inputs for tomorrow’s follow-on applications.
Of course, the traditionalists would respond by
60
recommending greater use of utility model laws, and there has
been a trend towards enacting such laws in the developing
61
countries, including China. But the limits and weaknesses of
patent-like utility model laws have been well documented since
the 1970s at least, as are their inherent logical and economic
contradictions, even if such regimes often prove better than
62
nothing. Moreover, the Japanese experience suggests that
advantages accruing from the use of utility models to surround
foreign patents with tripwires of small-scale blocking effects tend
ET AL., REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL EXPERT GROUP ON PATENT LAW ISSUES (2009),
available at http://www.patentoffice.nic.in (expressing concerns that high standards for
judging nonobviousness will adversely affect cumulative innovation); see also Yu, supra
note 8, at 195–97 (noting that China initially overhauled its IPR system for admittance
into the WTO).
57.
Mueller, Taking TRIPS to India, supra note 56, at 541.
58.
See, e.g., id. (highlighting the controversy surrounding the Indian Patent
Office’s rejection of Gleevec’s patent application for a leukemia drug); MASHELKAR ET AL.,
supra note 56.
59.
See generally Reichman, supra note 53 (suggesting alternative intellectual
property protection approaches that would deter free-riding appropriation of small-scale
innovations without diminishing access to small-scale technical knowhow).
60.
See Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 2457–59 (explaining that utility
model laws are designed to provide shorter term protection than patent laws through
weaker nonobviousness standards and a narrower scope of protection); see also
Lichtman, supra note 53 (advocating use of state sui generis regimes for a similar
purpose).
61.
Lulin Gao, The Third Amendment of Patent Law and Its Implementation
Regulations in China, Paper Presented at the Second Global Forum on Intellectual
Property, Singapore Academy of Intellectual Property Law (Jan. 8–9, 2009); see also Feng,
supra note 9, at 19 (stressing limited innovation ability in China and the corresponding
need to encourage “invention creation” of utility models).
62.
See Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 2459 (citing authorities).
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to peter out once the country relying on this tactic shifts its own
63
domestic emphasis to relatively basic research. Sooner or later,
utility model laws thus merely re-propose the same fundamental
tensions that arise when too many patents cluster around the
same rapidly developing technologies, each of which is dependent
on preceding innovation and may stimulate equally dependent
64
successive applications.
In other words, the clear boundaries between property rights
that are a presupposed necessary condition for efficient trading of
knowledge goods have become inherently blurred and
overlapping as a consequence of the patent law’s struggle to keep
65
abreast of the changing conditions of technological progress.
Why should the BRIC countries, for example, not address this
and other related problems head on, instead of falling into the
same old traps and pitfalls that undermine systems of innovation
66
in the most developed countries?
That the traditionally structured OECD innovation
67
framework has become increasingly “brittle” over time appears
from even a quick review of its three main premises:
(1) Upstream scientific research, primarily theoretical in
nature, was to remain immune from IPRs and to be
68
regulated by the sharing norms of Mertonian science;
(2) Routine innovation (largely cumulative and sequential
in nature) was primarily protected as know-how by
trade secret laws, which established a vast semicommons accessible to all routine engineers willing to
reverse-engineer by honest means, while also providing
69
investors with natural lead time;

63.
See id. at 2455–59.
64.
See Eisenberg, supra note 49, 1063–64; Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic
Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
65.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 46–47; Eisenberg, supra note 49, at
1076–84 (discussing the possible dampening impact of patents and the accompanying due
diligence on research especially in industrial settings); Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note
12, at 103–04.
66.
Cf. Feng, supra note 9, at 15 (observing that one aim of China’s patent laws is to
“define the space where the public is free to exploit technology for invention-creations”).
67.
Geoffrey Yu, Remarks at the Second Global Forum on Intellectual Property,
Singapore Academy of Intellectual Property Law (Jan. 8–9, 2009).
68.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Property Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 181–84 (1987); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 77, 89–91 (1999).
69.
Reichman, supra note 55, at 289, 291–93; see also Lichtman, supra note 53, at
727–28 (stressing the chronic inability of lead time to recoup R&D costs).
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(3) Legal monopolies were to be bestowed only on significant
inventions, beyond the reach of routine engineers, while
competition rooted in legally protected lead time and
other comparative advantages drove the innovation
70
process.
Today, instead, universities aggressively patent government71
funded research results. Many countries protect even scientific
72
databases as such, and there is no clear line between theoretical
and applied research. The sharing norms of science have broken
down to the point where they can only be maintained by
contractually constructed scientific commons that artfully
manage legal, economic, and technical restrictions on data,
73
materials, and information. At the same time, the technical
know-how underlying cumulative and sequential innovation can
seldom be kept secret for very long. Hence, trade secret protection
also breaks down, and investors faced with mounting front-end
74
costs suffer from a chronic shortage of natural lead time.

70.
See Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 2521–22.
71.
DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 92–95
(2004); So et al., supra note 41, at 2078–79.
72.
See, e.g., Paul A. David, Koyaanisqatsi in Cyberspace: The Economics of an “Outof-Balance” Regime of Private Property Rights in Data and Information, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 81, 103 (detailing the implications of
the European Union Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases); J.H. Reichman &
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 76–77
(1997) (explaining the origins of EU’s decision to allow the sui generis protection of
databases). See generally ESTELLE DERCLAYE, THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF DATABASES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2008).
73.
See, e.g., JOHN WILBANKS & JAMES BOYLE, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE COMMONS 5
(2006), available at http://sciencecommons.org/wp-content/uploads/ScienceCommons_
Concept_Paper.pdf (describing the launch of Science Commons, a project designed “to ease
unnecessary legal and technical barriers to sharing, to promote innovation, [and] to provide
easy, high quality tools that let individuals and organizations specify the terms under which
they wished to share their material”); Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science:
Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 940–42 (2009)
[hereinafter Lee, Contracting to Preserve] (blaming the proliferation of patenting in
university research for the decrease in sharing of research findings); Reichman & Uhlir,
supra note 36, at 329–21 (advocating a new system of contractually created public access to
scientific data as the solution to the increasing problem of hoarding); Peter Lee, Toward a
Distributive Commons in Patent Law 33–34 (U.C. Davis Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 177, 2009) [hereinafter Lee, Distributive
Commons] (advocating a commons to solve the problems in technology distribution); JEROME
H. REICHMAN, TOM DEDEURWAERDERE & PAUL F. UHLIR, DESIGNING THE MICROBIAL
RESEARCH COMMONS: STRATEGIES FOR ACCESSING, MANAGING AND USING ESSENTIAL
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ASSETS, ch. 2 (Oct. 9, 2009), presented at the International Symposium
on Designing the Microbial Research Commons, Board on Research Data and Information,
Policy and Global Affairs Division, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 8–
9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).
74. Reichman, supra note 53, at 1747–48; see also Lichtman, supra note 53, at 727–28.
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In response, patents, copyrights, and sui generis laws
expand in all directions to absorb cumulative and sequential
innovations that lack other refuges from free-riding
75
appropriators and from the risk of market failure. This trend, in
turn, produces mounting thickets of rights that impede both
technological progress and research, while the risk of endless
litigation over uncertain legal boundaries leads to daunting
litigation costs and anticompetitive, defensive patent pools held
76
by big, but often slothful, technology distributors.
B. Where Developing Country Leadership Could Make a Difference
The incipient transnational system of innovation emerging
from the TRIPS Agreement will simply reproduce these same
unpropitious conditions if the BRIC countries and their allies
discreetly follow the models embedded in the most developed
intellectual property systems. What we need instead are new
models experimentally derived from bold attempts to deal
directly with these and other unsolved problems.
I cannot, within the confines of this short Article, explore
these problems in depth, although more and more academic
77
attention is being focused upon them. Let me instead put
forward a partial list of initiatives that the BRIC countries, and
other emerging economies, working perhaps within the
78
framework of a WIPO Development Agenda, could consider. The
list is not meant to be exhaustive, only suggestive, but it does
give an idea of the kind of initiatives that are needed.
1. Measures Concerning Patents. In 1997, I suggested that
developing countries could help to accommodate international
75.
See, e.g., Reichman, Hybrids, supra note 54, at 2525, 2531–34; Pamela
Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2339–40 (1994) (highlighting the necessity of legal proscription
against copying in order to encourage innovation in the software industry and “cure the
market failure that unconstrained copying would cause”).
76.
See Shapiro, supra note 24; Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1087–88 (exploring the
“burden of inertia” regarding intellectual property rights and the resulting distribution of
responsibility for the removal of access restrictions); see also Birgit Verbeure, Patent
Pooling for Gene-Based Diagnostic Testing. Conceptual Framework, in GENE PATENTS AND
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 3.
77.
See, e.g., GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24
(discussing existing models designed to render patented genetic inventions accessible for
use in research and exploring further alternatives); supra notes 49, 73; see also EUROPEAN
PATENT OFFICE, supra note 21.
78.
See, e.g., Jeremy de Beer, Defining WIPO “Development Agenda,” in
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA 1, 1–2, 6–8 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009); Peter Yu, A Tale of Two Development
Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465 (2009).
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minimum standards of patent protection to their national
development goals by adopting relatively stringent eligibility
standards covering subject matter, novelty, nonobviousness, and
79
disclosure.
a. Eligibility Standards in BRIC Countries. The one
country that has most aggressively pursued this strategy so far is
India, which particularly seeks to promote its pharmaceutical
industry. As Professor Kapczynski’s research confirms, India’s
patent law denies subject-matter eligibility to new uses of known
substances and new forms of known substances that do not
enhance “efficacy.” Its stiff nonobviousness standard requires “a
technical advance” or economic significance, all with a view to
discouraging “me-too” and derivative patents that would
circumscribe the space in which generic producers could
80
operate. Although India cannot legally vary eligibility standards
81
to suit the needs of different industries, its generally high
standards are reinforced by pre-grant and post-grant opposition
82
procedures, and by stringent disclosure requirements, which
other high- and middle-income developing countries would do
well to consider.
The level of nonobviousness to be established under the
recently enacted third revision of the Chinese Patent Law was
not clear at the time of writing. Article 22 reportedly requires
“prominent substantive features” and “notable” progress (as
distinct from utility models that require only “substantive
features” and “progress”); but the Patent Examiner’s Guidelines
simply invoke the “person skilled in the art” standard used in
most OECD countries without further illuminating the drafters’
83
intent.
The new Chinese law definitely adopts a broader, more
84
absolute standard of novelty than before, and it will allow a

79.
See Reichman, supra note 43, at 26–42.
80.
See The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 3(d)–(f), as
amended by The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005;
Kapczynski, supra note 4.
81.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27.1 (“[P]atents shall be available and
patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally produced.”); Dreyfuss, supra note
3, at 12 (explaining how India’s system adapted in order to meet the neutrality standard
in TRIPS, while ensuring that the public will continue to have access to generic drugs).
82.
See Mueller, supra note 34, at 567–74; Kapczynski, supra note 4.
83.
See, e.g., Gao, supra note 61; E-mail from Jia Hua, Ph.D. Candidate, The
Pennsylvania State University, to Jerome Reichman, Professor of Law, Duke University
School of Law (Nov. 17, 2009) (on file with Author).
84.
See, e.g., Gao, supra note 61 (discussing pending Articles 23 and 24); see also
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prior art defense to an infringement action that “to some extent
shifts [the] validity issue of a patent from . . . [the examiners] to
85
the court.” The Chinese law will also require disclosure of origin
for genetic resources, and may invalidate a pending patent if
laws and regulations pertaining to licit procurement and use of
86
such resources have been violated.
In general, it seems likely that the problems of low quality
patents that recently plagued developed countries would become
more pernicious if allowed to take root in high- and middleincome developing countries. In particular, low standards of
nonobviousness would allow powerful foreign companies that
accumulate patents on incremental innovations to block local
improvers in developing countries and to maintain patent pools
that could create formidable barriers to entry.
Even the United States has recently begun to elevate its
87
eligibility standards, although not as steeply as those in India.
88
Because governments cannot discriminate against foreigners,
however, high standards of eligibility must apply equally to local
inventors. The latter remain free to patent abroad, whatever the
89
status of their inventions at home, while “second tier” protection
may be available to stimulate local investment in small-scale
90
innovation.
Needless to say, the policy space for evaluating eligibility
standards against local development needs could shrink
drastically if such standards were harmonized by TRIPS-plus
91
specifications under a Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT).
Developing countries should accordingly continue to resist such a
harmonization exercise.
Wenting Cheng, Third Revision of Patent Law in China (Part I), INTELL. PROP. WATCH,
Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/09/08/third-revision-of-patent-law-inchina (discussing Article 22 of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2009), which extends
disclosure of prior use or any other means “from domestic (relative) to international
(absolute)”).
85.
Id.; Gao, supra note 61 (discussing pending art. 63).
86.
See infra notes 316–19 and accompanying text.
87.
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“[T]he results of
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws.”); In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll,
129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).
88.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 2.1, 3–4; Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property art. 2(1), Mar. 20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
89.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.1; Paris Convention, supra note 88, art.
4bis(1).
90.
See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes
158–63.
91.
See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 98–102.
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b. Problems on the Frontiers of Science. Another reason for
resisting premature harmonization exercises is that, even in
developed countries, experts remain uncertain how best to
92
resolve problems affecting cutting-edge technologies, which
makes evaluation of the relevant issues even more difficult in
developing countries. For example, recent studies of the seminal
genomic discoveries carried out at Duke University, under a
grant from the National Institutes of Health and the Department
of Energy, suggest a number of recurring problems on the
frontiers of science that sometimes pose unresolved problems for
93
the patent system as a whole. These include:
− Broad foundational patents that can block research and
downstream applications and that produce high transaction
94
costs for would-be users. For example, polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) and recombinant DNA cloning were covered
95
by a few patents, with narrowly averted blocking effects.
− An even bigger problem arises when basic research
platforms are covered by multiple patents held by dispersed
96
owners, public and private.
− More generally, thickets of overlapping patents may
cover a research platform or multiple components of an end
product, especially in interdisciplinary research fields. This
problem arises, for example, with regard to microarrays,
synthetic biology (which combines life sciences, computer
science, and electrical engineering), and now even
97
nanotechnology.
− With particular regard to information technology,
hundreds of patents on small contributions may yield patent
92.
See id. at 103.
93.
Jerome H. Reichman & Jennifer Giordano Coltart, A Holistic Approach to
Patents Affecting Frontier Sciences: Lessons from the Seminal Genomic Discovery
Studies, Paper Presented at the CEER Retreat, Duke University Center for Genetics,
Ethics & Law (Apr. 2008) and at the European Patent Forum: Inventing a Cleaner
Future: Climate Change and the Opportunities for IP, Ljubljana, Slovenia (May 2008).
94.
See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1084–85.
95.
Reichman & Giordano Coltart, supra note 93, at 4–6 (discussing Cohen-Boyer
patents), 5–6 (discussing PCR, which largely emerged from the private sector).
96.
See Frischmann, supra note 64, at 995–97 (asserting that competition among
downstream users for exclusive licenses favors uses reasonably expected to generate
appropriate returns, leaving “socially valuable research paths . . . fallow and unexplored”);
Lee, Contracting to Preserve, supra note 73, at 903.
97.
See Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1747 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 601, 618–22 (2005); Tim Lenoir & Eric Giannella, The Emergence and Diffusion of
DNA Microarray Technology, J. BIOMEDICAL DISCOVERY & COLLABORATION, Aug. 22, 2006,
available at http://www.j-biomed-discovery.com/content/pdf/1747-5333-1-11.pdf.
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thickets with vague boundaries, resulting in holdups and
98
excessive litigation. A similar, if less dramatic process
99
affects private-sector innovators in biotechnology, although
the extent of this problem in that sector remains
100
controversial.
− Massing of patents for defensive purposes (especially in
101
IT) may block entry to competitors and innovators.
All these problems—and the resulting transaction costs—were
then worsened by the proliferation of low quality patents,
especially in the United States.
These and related problems could inhibit research and keep
innovators in BRIC countries and other emerging economies from
realizing their full potential in the biotechnology and information
industries. They increasingly deter private-sector researchers
and investors in developed countries from exploring promising
102
routes, while placing universities in a delicate legal position as
academics ignore patents when conducting cutting-edge
103
research. Worse, they could eventually complicate the race for
innovative climate change technology if future massive
government funding were to replicate problems now experienced
104
in biotech and IT.

98.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 23, at 51–54 (attributing the “poor
performance of the notice function in the patent system” to “fuzzy and unpredictable”
patent boundaries, the ease with which patent boundary information can be hidden from
the public, the disconnect between patent rights and possession of an invention, and the
failure of systemic safeguards against patent proliferation); Rai, Allison & Sampat, supra
note 49, at 1551–54.
99.
Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1072; Warcoin, supra note 36, at 331–32
(describing a “patent tsunami” in diagnostics and related fields).
100.
Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1081–84 (summarizing studies of the experiences
of research-performing institutions regarding the effects of intellectual property
restrictions); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool
Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGEBASED ECONOMY 285, 292–93 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003)
(finding little empirical evidence of “constraints” on scientific research and considerable
evidence of widespread infringement by academic scientists who ignore patents); see
also Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295 (2007)
(finding little evidence that gene patents adversely impact research and public health
in contrast to biomedical patents on key pathways and patents on information
technologies).
101.
See Shapiro, supra note 24, at 120–21; Verbeure, supra note 76, at 4–7.
102.
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 1080; Warcoin, supra note 36, at 331–32;
see also Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the
Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 25,
27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005).
103.
See, e.g., Walsh et al., supra note 100.
104.
See Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 7–8.
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Generally speaking, the evidence points to the emergence of
complex frontier sciences that may require integrated
management in their upstream dimension (and sometimes even
105
in the applications domain). A holistic approach to intellectual
infrastructure may then become essential. But the patent system
operates on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis that is not designed to
address or govern such complex innovation systems. There
results a risk of systemic conflict between the holistic needs of
frontier science (with its own corresponding innovation policy)
106
and the methodology of traditional intellectual property laws.
i. Some Possible Solutions. In principle, at least five
primary measures, with varying degrees of nuance, can be
envisioned to address these challenges.
− A broad research exemption for the experimental users
of patented inventions to find new inventions, to invent
107
around old ones, or to develop improvements;
− An administrative or judicial power to require that the
108
invention be made available on a nonexclusive license;
− An anti-blocking provision, normally in the form of a
compulsory license for dependent patents, that allows
109
improvers to avoid infringing a dominant patent;
− An “essential facilities” doctrine, familiar from
competition law theory and practice, that would allow the
pooling of overlapping patents within a platform
110
technology;
105.
See Frischmann, supra note 96, at 998–1003 (advocating a hybrid of various
possible solutions to revive the information commons); van Overwalle, supra note 24, at
385–90.
106.
Reichman & Giordano Coltart, supra note 93, at 19.
107.
See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 64(1), Oct. 5, 1973,
1065 U.N.T.S. 255, 274; Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Freedom to Experiment: Toward a Concept of
Inventor Welfare, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 245 (2008).
108.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (explaining that in the current system, injunctions can be used as a
bargaining chip to charge licensees exorbitant fees).
109.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(l) (stating the conditions under
which a compulsory licence for a dependent patent may be granted); GUSTAVO GHIDINI,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 44–45 (2006) (advocating the use of
compulsory licensing where the subject of an existing patent “has been developed through
an entirely different and more advanced process”).
110.
See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential
Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10–21 (2008) (“Essential Facilities, Infrastructure, and
Open Access”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1744–45 (2003)
(promoting the idea of cross-licenses that allow parties to use each other’s technology
without fear of liability); Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust
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− Compulsory
licensing,
either
for
government
(noncommercial) use or to enable third parties to supply the
111
market in the public interest.
In practice, the availability of these solutions, and still
112
others that have been proposed in developed countries, varies
from country to country and is always somewhat problematic.
Yet, nothing in the multilateral conventions prevents developing
countries from implementing these and other related provisions
in their domestic laws.
U.S. patent law currently lacks a bona fide research
exemption, and there is little chance that legislative reform will
fill this gap. The formal position in the European Union is
113
better, but actual state practice seems to have narrowed the
factual availability of this exception. If so, that state of affairs
would
afford
an
obvious
opportunity
for
“counter114
harmonization” where developing countries could take the lead.
The Chinese Patent Law, as amended in 2008, codifies a socalled Bolar exception, which permits generic producers to
reverse-engineer patented medicines and to conduct clinical
115
trials prior to the expiration of the patent. A WTO panel upheld
the legitimacy of this exception under Article 30 of the TRIPS

Analysis: The Twisted Journey of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (“[W]hen a monopolist or near-monopolist controlling what is deemed an
‘essential facility’ denies an actual or potential competitor access to that facility, where
the facility cannot reasonably be duplicated and where there is no valid . . . justification
for denying access, then the doctrine is applied.”). But see Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2004) (declining to recognize or
repudiate the essential facilities doctrine but suggesting that it would not mandate
complete cooperation between competitors even if recognized).
111.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31; Jerome H. Reichman with
Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical
Perspective Under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA 10, 24
(Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 5, 2003), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2008/06/cs_reichman_hasenzahl.pdf (chronicling the history of
compulsory licenses and the situations in which such licenses can be used most
effectively).
112.
See generally GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra
note 24 (exploring proposals and experience with patent pools, clearing houses, open
source models, and liability regimes).
113.
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360–62 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (narrowly
construing the experimental use defense to patent infringement); Peritz, supra note 107;
Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market (Community Patent
Convention), art. 31(b), 1976 O.J. (L 17) 1, 9; Agreement Relating to Community Patents,
art. 27(b), 1989 O.J. (L 401) 1, 15 (not yet in force).
114.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
115.
See Feng, supra note 9, at 109 & n.190 (arguing that Article 69(5) of the Chinese
Patent Law (as amended 2008) “helps to balance the relationship between the interests of
the patentee and the public [ ] and to prevent the abuse of patent rights”).
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116

Agreement. Whether Chinese patent law will maintain a broad
exception for scientific research generally was not clear at the
117
time of writing.
118
There is no anti-blocking provision in U.S. patent law.
Hence, if a dominant patentee and an improver bargain to
impasse, as occurs from time to time, the dominant patentee may
keep a patented improvement off the market because its sale or
119
use would infringe the former’s patent. While this result may
suit a dominant patentee because it defends him or her from a
serious threat of competition, it lessens social welfare by
120
depriving the public of the improved product,
unless the
government intervenes with a public interest compulsory license.
Many European countries have accordingly codified
121
compulsory licenses for dependent patents, which are perfectly
122
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, although European
patent authorities had, until recently, been reluctant to grant
them in practice. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
authorities in Europe may now be more willing to grant such
licenses and that, even in the past, parties in Italy, Germany,
and the United Kingdom tended to bargain around the possible
threat of such an anti-blocking measure, despite the fact that few
123
such licenses were actually granted.
While China will include a dependent compulsory license in
its pending patent reform, its availability in other developing
124
countries is not widely reported. Here, in other words, one finds
a relatively uncontroversial candidate for actual harmonization
under TRIPS, rather than “counter-harmonization,” that
developing countries should wholeheartedly embrace.
Even in the absence of a patented improvement as such, the
complexity of present-day inventions in which numerous
overlapping patents may be combined makes it advisable that
116.
Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.45,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
117.
See, e.g., Feng, supra note 9, at 109 n.190 (noting the existence of an “exception
for the purpose of scientific research and experiment” in prior law without further
comment on its scope).
118.
See Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1994).
119.
GHIDINI, supra note 109, at 36–37.
120.
Id. at 37–41.
121.
See Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra note 111, at 12.
122.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(l).
123.
Interviews with Professors Ghidini, Anderman, and Hanns Ullrich.
124.
See Gao, supra note 61. It seems likely, but not certain, that a compulsory
license for a dependent patent could be justified under Article 84 of the Indian patent law
as it exists. See Kapczynski, supra note 4.
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courts have the power to deny permanent injunctions for
infringement in the public interest and to allow compensation
instead, preferably in the form of reasonable royalties. This use
of a liability rule, rather than a property rule, seems especially
pertinent when the parties are not in head-to-head competition,
or when one of them does not actually work the patents it owns,
125
as cases following the Supreme Court’s eBay decision in the
126
Professor
United States have increasingly recognized.
Kapczynski, among others, rightly commends this approach to
the developing countries, and she presents evidence that Indian
127
case law has already begun to cite eBay with approval.
At higher levels of technological development, moreover, the
advent of platform technologies, often affecting upstream
research tools, may arise suddenly out of a convergence of
formerly separate interdisciplinary pursuits. Such a situation
can present formidable holdout problems that can adversely
affect both basic research and downstream applications, as
128
occurred in the case of microarrays. If nothing is done, a
dominant aggregator may sometimes solve the problem by means
of vertical integration, while leaving the progress of science in an
uncertain state and possibly generating serious antitrust
129
problems to boot.
To solve this problem, when it arises, governments need the
authority to override existing exclusive licenses and to grant
nonexclusive licenses to additional or alternative parties in the
130
public interest. For example, governments must be able to pool or
bundle platform technologies and to make the platform available as
a whole to downstream applications when the platform becomes an

125.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006) (determining that a
patent holder’s lack of commercial activity in working a patent should not automatically
preclude the granting of a permanent injunction, nor does a finding of infringement
automatically entitle the holder to such an injunction).
126.
See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs. v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir.
2007) (applying the eBay holding and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that it is entitled
to injunctive relief to remedy a copyright infringement).
127.
Kapczynski, supra note 4; Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Policy for a New Era, 37
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264, 267–68 (2009).
128.
See, e.g., Lenoir & Giannella, supra note 97; Kumar & Rai, supra note 97;
Frischmann, supra note 64.
129.
See, e.g., Audio tape: Suzanne Scotchmer, A Nonobvious Discussion of Patents,
held by the 7th Annual Meredith and Kip Frey Lecture in Intellectual Property, Duke
University Law School (Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/webcast/
podcast/?match=Suzanne+Scotchmer (discussing the dominant aggregatory outcome);
Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110, at 10–28.
130.
See, e.g., So et al., supra note 41; Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual
Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 102–20 (2008); Reichman et al., supra note 40.
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essential infrastructure for future research and innovation. In
that case, all third parties who use the pooled technology should
have to pay equitable compensation from their applications to the
132
bundle or trust, for distribution to right holders.
In principle, competition law can reach a comparable result by
means of an “essential facilities” doctrine, which has sometimes
133
been used in the European Union, but remains in a semi134
moribund state under existing case law in the United States. Of
course, a compulsory license for government use can also be invoked
to address such a situation without a need to surmount the hurdles
of competition law, and the United States has invoked government
135
use licenses for similar purposes in the past. Both India and
China have enacted comprehensive compulsory licensing schedules
136
that appear to clearly encompass such a power.
Nevertheless,
developing
countries
with
growing
technological prowess should consider fashioning at least some
guidelines, if not an actual codification, that would enable the
authorities to intervene under an established “essential facilities”

131.
See, e.g., So et al., supra note 41, at 2081; Verbeure, supra note 76, at 16–20
(case studies), 21–29 (application to diagnostic testing); Frischmann, supra note 64;
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 890–91 (1990) (demonstrating that a government-imposed patent
pool enabled the manufacture of airplanes for use in World War I).
132.
See, e.g., REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 2
(proposing pooled semicommons for upstream microbial research materials, with liability
rules for downstream applications); see also Lee, supra note 130, at 112–16 (showing the
critical role of liability rules in preserving access to intellectual infrastructure); Arti K.
Rai, Jerome H. Reichman, Paul F. Uhlir & Colin Crossman, Pathways Across the Valley of
Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 20–30 (2008) (proposing the pooling of pre-competitive small
molecule libraries, with liability rule option); Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 28–33
(identifying technical tools under the TRIPS Agreement for breaking obstacles to transfer
of green technologies). See generally Reichman, supra note 53, at 1776–77 (proposing a
compensatory liability regime in place of a model that favors hybrid exclusive rights).
133.
See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601;
Emanuela Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad Between Monopolization
and Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared, 24 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 455, 486–87 (2006) (noting that the European Court of
Justice has never formally recognized the “essential facilities” doctrine); Rita Coco,
Antitrust Liability for Refusal to License Intellectual Property: A Comparative Analysis
and the International Setting, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 14–17 (2008) (discussing
the evolution of the “exceptional circumstances” doctrine as applied by the European
Court of Justice to create an “essential facilities” paradigm).
134.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
410–11 (2004) (declining to recognize or repudiate the “essential facilities” doctrine). But
see Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110 (making the case for revitalizing this
doctrine to promote access to intellectual infrastructure).
135.
Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra note 111, at 5.
136.
See, e.g., Feng, supra note 9, at 29–31; Kapczynski, supra note 4; Gao, supra
note 61.
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doctrine in order to rescue a platform technology when
137
Such intervention becomes
circumstances so require.
particularly necessary when holdouts elevate the prices charged
for use of the platform to the point where both research and
applications risk becoming casualties of deadweight loss.
Notice that, with regard to compulsory licenses for
government use, which are widely invoked in the United States
for multiple purposes, and not just national security, the TRIPS
138
Agreement limits exports to 49.9% of production. So it became
necessary to amend TRIPS to allow back-to-back compulsory
licenses, thus enabling countries with capacity to manufacture
medicines to supply poor countries that needed access to generic
drugs but lacked manufacturing capacity under compulsory
139
licenses of their own. Both China and India have adopted
legislation enabling them to supply generic versions of patented
140
medicines to other countries under this scheme.
There is a larger principle here of considerable importance.
For example, developing countries may need to assist each other
with access to essential climate change technologies, and pooled
141
procurement strategies may become advisable. So this concept of
back-to-back compulsory licenses for inputs of essential technology
may need to be broadened, and NGOs concerned about access to
green technologies have already commissioned studies of this
142
topic.

137.
Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110, at 17–28.
138.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(f) (“[A]ny such use shall be authorized
predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such
use.” (emphasis added)); Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra note 111, at 5.
139.
See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31, ¶ 6 (“WTO Members with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”);
World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
¶ 2, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003); World Trade Organization, General Council Decision of 6
December 2005, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, Annex, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005)
(pending ratification by Members); Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 942
(explaining the requirements for granting compulsory licenses to exporting members
under paragraph 6 of the Doha Public Health Declaration).
140.
See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 969; Feng, supra note 9, at 100–01
(discussing Article 50 of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2008)). See generally
Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions:
Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247 (2009) (tracing the relevant legislative
history pertaining to compulsory licensing of patented pharmaceuticals and the effect of
the waiver to, and amendment of, Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement).
141.
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 973–79 (advocating pooled procurement
strategies when seeking essential medicines under compulsory licenses enabled by the
waiver to TRIPS art. 31(f)).
142.
See Abbott, supra note 40, at 26; Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 25–28
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ii. Checks and Balances in the Public Funding of Research.
The developing countries that are more technologically advanced
should also formulate their own approach to regulating the
patenting of government-funded research results, particularly
those obtained by universities and other public research centers.
143
Although the benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act are well advertised,
the unresolved problems it creates are also increasingly well
documented, as are a growing list of needed reforms, which will
144
be hard to enact in the United States.
Recently, seven American experts published a detailed list of
concerns about the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act in the United
145
States,
and they recommended a number of minimum
146
Perhaps the most
safeguards in the public interest.
fundamental recommendation was that publicly funded
university research results should not be exclusively licensed,
147
unless such a license becomes essential for commercialization.
Because many research tools can be used off the shelf without
further downstream R&D, as was the case with the Cohen-Boyer
148
patents in DNA sequencing,
an exclusive license is often
unnecessary and counterproductive.
Other recommendations these authors put forward are as
follows:
− The governing legislation should ensure transparency
in the patenting and licensing of publicly funded research
149
results.
− Where initial licensing arrangements for publicly
funded research do not achieve public interest objectives,
(suggesting cooperative methods for transfer of clean technology from developed countries
to developing countries).
143.
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
144.
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 310–11 (recommending reforms to the
Bayh-Dole Act that would allow more latitude for funding agencies and would
maximize the social value of federally funded inventions and discoveries); So et al.,
supra note 41, at 2079–80 (analyzing recent studies showing that the Bayh-Dole Act
has not significantly increased revenues earned by academic institutions from patent
licensing and noting the tax-like effect that the law has on institutions with licenses on
the resulting patents).
145.
So et al., supra note 41, at 2078. Besides Anthony So, the authors included
Bhaven Sampat, Arti K. Rai, Robert Cook-Deegan, Jerome H. Reichman, Robert
Weissman, and Amy Kapczynski.
146.
Id. at 2081.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 2079 (demonstrating that nonexclusive licensing did not deter the
commercialization of the Cohen-Boyer patents for recombinant DNA, which produced
$255 million in licensing revenues while reportedly contributing to 2,442 new products
and $35 billion in sales).
149.
Id. at 2081.

(4) REICHMAN

1144

12/22/2009 10:14:45 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[46:4

governmental authorities must have power to override such
licenses and to grant licenses to additional or alternative
150
parties.
− The government should retain an automatic right to
151
use any invention arising from its funding.
− Besides promoting commercialization of upstream
research results, the government must ensure consumer
access to end products on reasonable terms and
152
conditions.
− Governments should not presume that either patenting
or exclusive licenses are necessarily the best options, but
may instead “focus on placing by default or by strategy
government-funded inventions into the public domain,
creating a scientific commons, enabling collective
management of intellectual property, or fostering open153
source innovation.”
− “Where
greater
commercial
incentives
seem
necessary, the benefits of nonexclusive licensing should
always be weighed against the social cost of exclusive
154
licenses.”
In other words, instead of simply imitating the U.S. model as
it stands, the developing countries should try to formulate
improved versions of the Bayh-Dole principle. Such efforts would
better address both the need to ensure access to research tools for
the research community and the question of abusive pricing of
end products, given the extent to which relevant R&D costs were
borne by taxpayers in the first instance. In this connection,
developing countries need to devise their own public–private
initiatives to endow venture capital funds (and perhaps related
155
research prize contests ) that might emulate or improve upon
150.
Id.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
153.
Id. at 2082; see also BOYLE, supra note 23 (chapter on Science Commons); Janet
Hope, Open Source Genetics. Conceptual Framework, in GENE PATENTS AND
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 171; Esther van Zimmerman,
Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Genetic Diagnostics, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE
LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 63.
154.
So et al., supra note 41, at 2078.
155.
See, e.g., JAMES LOVE & TIM HUBBARD, THE BIG IDEA: PRIZES TO STIMULATE
R&D FOR NEW MEDICINES 9 (2007), available at http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/
bigidea-prizes.pdf (discussing the development of a prize system as an alternative to
exclusive marketing rights); Audio tape: Thomas Pogge, The AstraZeneca Lecture of 2008,
held by the Federation of European Pharmacological Societies (July 13–17, 2008),
available at http://www.ephar2008.org/downloads/TPoggePublicEthicsRadioLatest.pdf.
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the successful models currently deployed in some OECD
countries.
Unfortunately, India’s hurried enactment of a Bayh-Dolelike statute without due regard to these proposed safeguards
156
does not bode well for the future. Similar statutes are under
consideration in numerous other countries, including South
157
Africa, and it remains to be seen whether greater caution will
be exercised there than was the case in India.
iii. Smarter Use of Second Tier Regimes. While the
emerging economies as a whole should maintain relatively procompetitive markets for innovation vis-à-vis the highprotectionist regimes in the United States and the European
Union, this strategy does not require developing countries to
sacrifice their own domestic innovators to free-riding
appropriators. Rather, these countries need to outsmart the highprotectionists by fashioning intellectual property regimes that
match their own needs and capacities without violating
158
international IP norms.
In particular, they could take the lead in making sensible
uses of liability rules to stimulate rapid exchanges of cumulative
and sequential innovation, especially for purposes of follow-on
159
innovation,
while reserving strong exclusive rights for a
relatively restricted class of truly nonobvious inventions. China’s
second amendment to its Patent Law in 2000 may have taken a
step in that direction by allowing a compulsory license when
utility model owners refuse to deal on reasonable terms or
160
conditions.

156.
The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008,
Bill No. LXVI of 2008 (India); see also Sampat, supra note 41; Rahul Vartak & Manish
Saurastri, The Indian Version of the Bayh-Dole Act, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Mar./Apr.
2009, at 62–64 (noting concerns that the Indian law was hastily drafted without public
debate and fails to protect the public interest but insisting that the bill “is a step in the
right direction”).
157.
So et al., supra note 41, at 2078.
158.
See Reichman, supra note 53, at 1754–56 (advocating a liability rule for smallscale innovation to avoid the social costs of hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights);
see also Lichtman, supra note 53.
159.
Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local
Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 337, 356–58 (proposing a
compensatory liability regime to advance the interests of developing countries without
impeding follow-on innovation or creating barriers to entry).
160.
See Feng, supra note 9, at 30 (citing Articles 48 and 51 of the Chinese Patent
Law 2000). Actual use of this provision was not known at the time of writing.
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As previously discussed, there are several ways developing
countries could achieve this different kind of balance: by enacting
and implementing compulsory licenses for dependent
161
improvements;
by limiting injunctions to cases that
demonstrably serve the public interest, now once again a
162
characteristic of U.S. law and practice; or by codifying an ex
ante regime of compensatory liability rules that I have elsewhere
described, which might particularly benefit commercial
163
exploitation of traditional knowledge and related resources.
iv. Incentives
for
Promoting
Public
Health,
the
Environment, and Collaborative Research. Developing countries
should take the lead in revamping increasingly obsolete
approaches to the use of IPRs in the field of medicine. In no other
area is there a greater need for innovative approaches, with an
ever-lengthening list of potential tools that could be used to
increase research outputs and to achieve better distributional
outcomes as well. These include:
− Proposals for pre-competitive pooling of privately
owned small molecule libraries, with a view to facilitating
the upstream identification of promising target molecules
164
through university-generated assay designs;
− Proposals for public–private technology pools that
would undo patent thickets and stimulate investment, while
preserving revenues from downstream applications for single
165
depositors;
− Proposals for government funding of clinical trial
studies, with corresponding buy-ins at the international level
and release of results to the worldwide scientific
166
community;
161.
See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
162.
See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text; Kapczynski, supra note 4
(discussing F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., (2008) 642 I.A., in which the Indian
tribunal referenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s eBay decision when denying an injunction
to promote access to medicine).
163.
See supra notes 59, 159 and accompanying text.
164.
See Rai et al., supra note 132, at 21–22.
165.
See Roy Widdus, Product Development Partnerships on ‘Neglected Diseases’:
Intellectual Property and Improving Access to Pharmaceuticals for HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 205, 211–14 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006); see also Carmen E.
Correa, The SARS case. IP Fragmentation and Patent Pools, in GENE PATENTS AND
COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS, supra note 24, at 42; Verbeure, supra note 76
(diagnostic testing).
166.
See Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ.
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− Proposals for buy-outs and humanitarian licensing,
as well as for pooled procurement strategies under the
amended TRIPS provisions, with a view to encouraging the
distribution of essential medicines on a “high-volume, low168
margin” marketing strategy; and

167

− Proposals for prizes and other novel research
inducements that would help to separate the research and
169
marketing functions in the medical sector.
Were the leading developing countries to pursue their own
proactive policies in this area, precisely at a time when their
medical research capacity keeps growing, it could lead to novel
and perhaps breakthrough solutions of benefit to the rest of the
world.
Less innovative, but still worth considering, is the possibility
170
under Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement for any country to
adopt a regime of international exhaustion, with a view to
permitting parallel imports of patented products from any place
where the product in question was put on the market with the
patentee’s authorization. China’s third amendment of its Patent
Law in 2008 has reportedly instituted just such a regime, with an
eye to obtaining “patented medicine which China has difficulty in
171
manufacturing or otherwise obtaining.” Parallel imports may
also help some developing countries obtain “green technologies”
at more affordable prices, although this process can also exert
upward pressures on the prices generally charged in developing
172
countries, in order to avoid arbitrage through parallel imports.
“Green technologies” are, of course, another area where
developing countries could supply much needed leadership. Here

INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 52–53 (2009); Tracy R. Lewis, Jerome H. Reichman & Anthony
D. So, The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical Trials, ECONOMISTS’
VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1, 1–2, http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol4/iss1/art3.
167.
See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1109 (2005)
(detailing a “neglected disease exemption” to advance access to biomedical technology in
low- to middle-income countries); James Love, Four Practical Measures to Enhance Access
to Medical Technologies, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS
TO MEDICINES, supra note 165, at 241, 243 (showing that the flexibilities in the TRIPS
Agreement allow for humanitarian licensing to address public health crises); Kevin
Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low and Middle-Income
Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 171 (2006).
168.
Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 973–83.
169.
LOVE & HUBBARD, supra note 155, at 2–4.
170.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 6.
171.
Feng, supra note 9, at 104–06 (assessing the impact of parallel import as
authorized by Article 69 of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2008)).
172.
See Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 33–37.
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some recent studies suggest that IPRs have so far been playing
173
The problems elsewhere
an appropriately stimulatory role.
observed in regard to information technology and biotechnology
have not yet seriously appeared in this sector, perhaps because it
remains at an incipient stage, with many small players and with
174
Precisely
relatively few large-scale capital investments.
because emerging economies could participate on the ground
floor of future developments in environmental technologies, it
behooves their governments to devise collaborative strategies to
foster maximum growth and participation, without the
impediments that excessive protection has caused in other
175
sectors.
Moreover, there is growing interest in new strategies to
develop the so-called sharing economy, which has produced such
176
successes as the open-source operating system and Wikipedia.
Considerable efforts are also underway to devise new forms of
scientific cooperation that could cut through legal, technical, and
economic barriers to the Mertonian sharing ethos, that could help
to establish worldwide scientific networks and commons on an
unprecedented scale, and that might extend “open source”
177
methodologies to new fields of study. Here, again, developing
173.
See JOHN H. BARTON, MITIGATING CLIMATE CHANGE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 9–10 (2008), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/12357_1008barton.pdf; John H. Barton, Intellectual
Property and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing Countries 18 (Int’l Ctr. for
Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 2, 2007), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/
New%202009/CC%20Barton.pdf.
174.
See Maskus & Okediji, supra note 40, at 2–3; Reichman et al., supra note 40, at
7–8.
175.
See CHATHAM HOUSE, CHANGING CLIMATES: INTERDEPENDENCIES ON ENERGY
AND CLIMATE SECURITY FOR CHINA AND EUROPE 61 (2007), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/eedp/papers/view/-/id/580
(discussing
the
bilateral establishment of standards to encourage trade and investment between China
and the European Union); INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., GENEVA ANNUAL
CHINA DIALOGUE: CHINA, TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2008), available at
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2009/03/geneva-annual-china-dialogue-on-trade-and-cliamtechange-meeting-report1.pdf (summarizing different approaches to promote research on
climate change in developing countries).
176.
See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 70–71 (2006) (examining
the development of Wikipedia); BOYLE, supra note 23, at 197–98.
177.
REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, chs. 2, 5 (proposing a
digitally integrated microbial research commons covering materials, literature, and data).
See generally Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36 (proposing contractually reconstructed
research commons for scientific data); Jonathan M. Barnett, Sharing in the Shadow of
Property: Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets 57–68 (Univ. S. Cal. Ctr. in Law,
Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C08-22, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1287283 (discussing the evolution of open source software in the United States);
Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 73, at 918–19 (demonstrating that open source
methods provide a model for the contractual creation of a biomedical science research
commons); Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg,
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178

and

2. Measures Concerning Copyrights and Neighboring
Rights. Another task badly in need of innovative solutions is the
quest for sensible exceptions to, and limitations on, the exclusive
rights of domestic copyright laws that are otherwise governed by
the TRIPS Agreement and the under-theorized “three-step test”
179
it incorporated from the Berne Convention. Here, major efforts
are under way in both academic and government circles to
rethink the question of exceptions and limitations from a more
public interest perspective than was possible in the immediate
180
aftermath of TRIPS.
Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-26, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265793 (proposing a research framework for the analysis of
constructed cultural commons in the context of intellectual property).
178.
See, e.g., Mizukami & Lemos, supra note 33, at 46–47 (analyzing Brazil’s
tecnobrega industry to show that innovation can thrive without a system of intellectual
property enforcement); Alessandro Octaviani, Biotechnology in Brazil: Promoting Open
Innovation, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN BRAZIL, supra note 33, at 127, 134–36
(discussing the Genoma Program in Brazil to show that a decentralized network approach
to biotechnology can be successful in a developing country); Minna Allarakhia, Open
Source Biopharmaceutical Innovation—A Mode of Entry for Firms in Emerging Markets, 6
J. BUS. CHEMISTRY 11, 11 (2009).
179.
See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13 (“Members shall confine
limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the right holder.”); Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works art. 9(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971, and amended
on Sept. 28, 1979, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986) (“It shall be a matter for legislation in
the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.”).
180.
See, e.g., P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ & RUTH L. OKEDIJI, OPEN SOC’Y INST.,
CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO
COPYRIGHT 19 (2008) (emphasizing the need to ensure that copyright laws are “effectively
harnessed for the public good”); Christophe Geiger et al., Max Planck Institute for Intell.
Prop., Competition & Tax Law, Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation of the “ThreeStep Test” in Copyright Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707 (2008)
[hereinafter Three-Step Test] (emphasizing the need to consider not only the interests of
right holders, but also the public); Marianne Levin, Intellectual Property Rights in
Transition: Legal Structures and Concepts in Adaptation to Technological Challenges
Towards an Intellectual Property System for the 21st Century, 42 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L.
83, 88 (2002) (highlighting the importance of safeguarding investments with public
interests); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Time for a Paradigm Shift? Exploring Maximum
Standards in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 TRADE L. & DEV. 56 (2009);
see also WIPO, Proposal for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, Annex,
WIPO Doc. PCDA/1/5 (Feb. 17, 2006) (noting developing countries’ proposal for the
adoption of a Treaty on Access to Knowledge); infra note 195 and accompanying text (CEC
Green Paper (2008)). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users
Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 22–27 (2004) (suggesting ways to combat the “oneway ratchet” of intellectual property protection without regard to the public interest);
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Much has been written lately about the excesses of recent
copyright legislation in general, and the concomitant expansion
of related rights, including database protection laws, which
increasingly complicate and obstruct the very creativity and
innovation that intellectual property rights were originally
181
182
designed to promote. Nowhere are these tensions so acute or
so likely to generate disproportionately large social costs as in
183
the field of basic scientific research. In particular, abundant
evidence now shows that science-hostile intellectual property
laws, in combination with the science publishers’ restrictive
licensing practices, collide head-on with core advances in
184
digitally integrated scientific research methods.

Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted
Work, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 984–85 (2007); Knowledge Economy Int’l, Proposal for
Treaty on Access to Knowledge art. 3-1, http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (stressing the need for limitations to copyrights when the
public use value outweighs the cost to the copyright holder).
181.
See generally BENKLER, supra note 176, at 470–71 (discussing the difficulty that
will be involved in passing the needed reforms); BOYLE, supra note 23, at 26; DAVID L.
LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, NO LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN
ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 157 (2008) (discussing the failure of copyright law to protect
freedom of expression and freedom of the press); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE
NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 188–94 (2005) (providing specific examples of the
barriers to innovation resulting from current copyright law); James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33, 43–44; Paul Edward Geller, Beyond the Copyright
Crisis: Principles For Change, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165, 168 (2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114372 (“The growth of copyright law has inexorably impinged
on basic interests in freedom of expression and privacy.”).
182.
See, e.g., Reto Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, in COPYRIGHT LAW:
A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 315, 318 (Paul Torremans ed., 2007)
[hereinafter Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research] (“[Scientists] have suddenly
become aware that copyright is not only capable of providing them with protection for
their achievements, but also that under certain circumstances it can become an
obstacle . . . .”); Reto M. Hilty, Five Lessons About Copyright in the Information Society:
Reaction of the Scientific Community to Over-Protection and What Policy Makers Should
Learn, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103, 116–18 (2006) [hereinafter Hilty, Five Lessons];
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36, at 396–415 (evaluating social costs of a disintegrating
scientific research commons); Pamela Samuelson, Anticircumvention Rules: Threat to
Science, 293 SCIENCE 2028, 2028 (2001) (“Recent legislation in the United States and
Europe whose ostensible purpose is to protect copyrighted works from pirates is being
used to inhibit science and stifle academic research . . . .”).
183.
See, e.g., Paul David, The Economic Logic of “Open Science” and the Balance
Between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Scientific Data and
Information: A Primer, in THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA AND
INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 19, 27 (Julie M. Esanu & Paul F. Uhlir eds., 2003)
(discussing how the proliferation of intellectual property rights is inhibiting access to
information in several areas, including basic research); Maskus & Reichman, supra
note 2, at 16–17 (discussing the difficulty of ensuring that the social benefits of current
innovation are not outweighed by the social costs of deterring future innovation).
184.
See generally REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 3;
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a. Privatizing the Scientific Research Commons. On one
hand, new information technologies and related scientific tools,
especially bioinformatics, are transforming traditional scientific
185
fields, such as molecular biology, and are spawning new fields
such as genomics and proteonomics, with unlimited scientific
186
opportunities in the digital environment.
The worldwide scientific community needs to develop and
expand these digital opportunities, especially at public research
institutes and universities, while maintaining the classical
functions of certification and diffusion of research results
187
inherited from the pre-digital print epoch.
On the other hand, the digital revolution that created such
promising opportunities for scientific research “also generated
intense fears that hardcopy publishers would become vulnerable
to massive infringements online and to other threats of market
188
failure.” In response, publishers pushed legislatures to recast
and restructure copyright law in the online environment so as to
189
preserve business models built around the print media. As
Professor Okediji and I have noted before:
In so doing, [publishers] managed to curb pre-existing
limitations and exceptions (L&Es) in the online
environment, including those favorable to science; to embed
pay-per-use machinery into electronic fences surrounding
online transmissions even of scientific articles; and,
particularly in the EU and increasingly elsewhere, to add
new sui generis data protection disciplines that restrict

Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 78 (discussing the problem of data protection
disciplines that “restrict access to the very facts, data, and information that are the
lifeblood of basic scientific research”).
185.
REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 3.
186. [T]he use of computational methodologies within the life sciences, such as
bioinformatics, in the building of global collections of articles and data in
microbiology, and in the integration of relevant research results makes it
possible to build accumulative, field specific knowledge repositories that capture
reams of relevant scientific and technical information and data about microorganisms . . . . [S]toring, curating, maintaining and making this huge
accumulation of genomic data of interest to microbiology presents unique
problems as well as unique opportunities. Once available, there is a pressing
need to develop general data-mining tools for automated knowledge discovery in
the chosen environment and to establish dynamically updated and flexible
portals for disseminating research results.
Id. at 61 (citations omitted).
187.
See id. at 61–63.
188.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 8.
189.
See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 369,
405–06 (1997); see also Geller, supra note 181, at 166 (“Copyright law is in crisis. . . . [I]t has
become more and more complicated and less and less reliable, while losing legitimacy.”).
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access to the very facts, data, and information that are the
190
lifeblood of basic scientific research.

As a result, thickets of rights, backed by Technological Protection
Measures (TPMs) and Digital Rights Management (DRM)
restrictions in the online environment, impede effective
exploitation of automated knowledge discovery tools by blocking
integrated access to scientific information and data scattered
over a broad range of articles and databases that may or may not
191
be available online.
Scientists need, and traditionally depend on, a robust public
domain, in which existing information and data become inputs to
future knowledge assets that cannot be generated without them.
Instead, successful special interest lobbying at both the
192
193
national and international levels has overprotected existing
knowledge goods at the expense of the public domain, while
compromising
digitally
empowered
scientific
research
opportunities with little regard for the social costs and burdens
imposed on future creation and innovation.
High-level officials at the European Commission have
publicly recognized the dangers to public science in this
194
situation. In 2008, the Commission itself issued a Green Paper,
190.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 8; see J.H. Reichman & Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 95 (1997); see also
DERCLAYE, supra note 72.
191.
See, e.g., NANCY L. MARON & K. KIRBY SMITH, CURRENT MODELS OF DIGITAL
SCHOLARLY COMMUNICATION 31 (2008), available at http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/currentmodels-report.pdf; Hilty, Copyright Law and Scientific Research, supra note 182, at 315;
Paul A. David, New Moves in ‘Legal Jujitsu’ to Combat the Anti-commons: Mitigating IPR
Constraints on Innovation thru a ‘Bottom-up’ Approach to Systemic Institutional Reform
(Dynamics of Insts. & Mkts. in Europe, Working Paper No. 81, 2008), available at
http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/WP81-IPR.pdf.
192.
See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Council Directive
2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 4, 9 (EC); Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) (EC);
see also Hilty, Five Lessons, supra note 182, at 112 (attributing the passage of the DMCA
to “sustained pressure from the entertainment industry’s powerful lobbying efforts”).
193.
See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-17 (1997) [hereinafter WCT] (an international treaty enacted in 1996 concerning
digital copyright issues); WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20,
1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997) (international treaty enacted in 1996 governing
so-called neighboring rights of performers and producers of sound recordings). Very
restrictive domestic implementation of these treaties is then re-exported to developing
countries by means of bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). See, e.g.,
Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 217–19 (Lorand Bartels & Federico
Ortino eds., 2006) (describing the process of enacting international agreements governing
copyright issues).
194.
See, e.g., Tilman Lüder, Copyright Expansion: Can We Have Too Much?,
Remarks at the Second Global Forum on Intellectual Property, Singapore Academy of
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seeking to foster a debate about how to better promote the “free
movement of knowledge and innovation” in the European Union’s
single market, with particular regard to the dissemination of
195
research, science, and educational materials.
Notwithstanding these initiatives, entrenched publishing
interests in the European Union and the OECD countries
generally have so far blocked any realistic prospects for top-down
legislative reforms, despite mounting worldwide pressures for
196
greater “access to knowledge.” This resistance has prodded the
scientific community to make greater efforts to manage its own
essential knowledge inputs by means that attempt to neutralize
the impediments to upstream research that intellectual property
197
rights increasingly spawn.
Some of these initiatives,
particularly those spun off from the Creative Commons and
Science Commons movements, have spread to developing
198
countries, with notable success, for example, in Brazil.
Intellectual Property Law (Jan. 8–9, 2009); Tilman Lüder, Remarks at the Workshop on
Creation and Innovation, Seventeenth Annual Fordham Intellectual Property Law
Institute Conference, Cambridge, United Kingdom (Apr. 15–16, 2009); Commission First
Evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases 23–24 (Dec. 12,
2005),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/databases/
evaluation_report_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (discussing the danger of sui generis
protection inhibiting innovation and growth).
195.
Commission Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, at 3, COM
(2008) 466/3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/copyrightinfso/greenpaper_en.pdf.
196.
Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008); Amy Kapczynski, Linking Ideas to
Outcomes: A Response, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 289, 289–90 (2008); James Love, Risks
and Opportunities for Access to Knowledge, in VISION OR HALLUCINATION? 187, 189
(Soledad Bervejillo ed., 2005).
197.
See MINNA ALLARAKHIA, D. MARC KILGOUR & J.D. FULLER, GAME MODELS OF
THE DEFECTION DILEMMA IN BIOPHARMACEUTICAL DISCOVERY RESEARCH 7 (2008),
http://orion.uwaterloo.ca/~hwolkowi/henry/reports/mitacs.d/pdf/David/pub1.pdf
(“Fully
disclosing knowledge facilitates future collaboration while appropriating knowledge
strengthens a researcher’s bargaining position for trade in knowledge.”); Peter Lee,
Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58
EMORY L.J. 889, 963–74 (2009); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36, at 416–60 (“A
Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Science and Innovation”); see also
Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) (providing free
copyright licenses to various works and allowing the creator to choose among several
levels of access); Science Commons, http://sciencecommons.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2009)
(providing a similar service for scientific works aimed at “[i]dentifying and lowering
unnecessary barriers to research”); WILBANKS & BOYLE, supra note 73, at 5 (describing
Science Commons as a project designed “to ease unnecessary legal and technical barriers to
sharing, to promote innovation, [and] to provide easy, high quality tools that let individuals
and organizations specify the terms under which they wished to share their material”).
198.
Pedro Paranaguá, A Comprehensive Framework for Copyright Protection and
Access to Knowledge: From a Brazilian Perspective and Beyond, in SOUTH PERSPECTIVE HOW DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CAN MANAGE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS TO
MAXIMIZE ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 103, 106 (Carlos M. Correa & Xuan Li eds., 2009);
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b. Remedial Measures Available to the BRIC Countries.
Developing countries labor under intense pressures from
developed countries to duplicate the very barriers to digitally
integrated scientific research that have been erected in OECD
countries. Instead, the BRIC countries in particular should
collectively resist these pressures and self-consciously adopt
limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights laws
that would digitally empower their own scientific research
communities without necessarily violating the relevant
international intellectual property agreements. If these
countries, and other emerging economies, marshaled the political
will and governance capacity to undertake such reforms, their
leadership in this area might give them a comparative advantage
at a time when local scientific and technical innovation has
begun to flourish in many key industrial sectors.
Accordingly, two fundamental recommendations are as
follows:
− First, the BRIC countries should codify the idea–
expression dichotomy—now established in the TRIPS
199
Agreement—as a central subject matter exception, and
they should clarify that the legislative intent is to implement
this exception at least as broadly as U.S. federal appellate
200
courts routinely do.
− Second, because the “use of automated knowledge tools
in general and computational science in particular, requires
scientists to reproduce entire articles from scientific journals;
to extract excerpts of varying lengths from them; and to
incorporate large extracts of data into their digital research
tools for data mining, virtual experiments, and other forms of
201
digital manipulation,” the BRIC countries will need a broad
and sweeping exemption for scientific research uses of
literature and data. The clarity of such an exemption should
require no gloss, no fine print, and no elaborately contrived
202
carve-outs.

Mizukami & Lemos, supra note 33, at 44–48.
199.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 9.2.
200.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 23–24 (citing authorities).
201.
Id. at 28; see, e.g., Victoria Stodden, Enabling Reproducible Research: Open
Licensing for Scientific Innovation, 13 INT’L J. COMM. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2009, at 1, 24–
25 (“How far the fair use exception extends into entire research compendia is not clear
since the contours of fair use of copyrighted scientific material are not clearly
delineated.”).
202.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 29–30.
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The Max Planck Institute has recently proposed that a broad
and general exemption of this kind should allow use and reuse of
published scientific materials for virtually any scientific purpose,
with express legitimatization of storage, archiving, data
203
extraction, linking, and the like. Such a reform should further
clarify that scientists remain free to subject any published
articles, and any scientific work made publicly available online,
to “data mining procedures, data manipulation by automated
knowledge tools, including virtual scientific experimentation,
without any constraint other than attribution under the norms of
204
science.” Any database protection laws that the BRIC countries
were unwise enough to enact (by, for example, succumbing to
pressures for bilateral agreements with the European Union)
would have to be similarly aligned with a broad copyright
205
exemption for uses of scientific literature.
Beyond these fundamental policy positions bearing on
scientific research, the BRIC countries should revise and expand
their copyright exceptions for libraries and educational
institutions generally, in order to fully exploit the policy space
deriving from flexibilities set out in the TRIPS Agreement and
other relevant treaties, especially the WIPO Copyright Treaty of
206
1996.
In this connection, the library community has been
developing a plan of action to promote access to knowledge in
developing countries, with particular regard to eliminating legal
barriers to cross-border flows of books, periodicals, and other
information in both the print media and the online
207
environment. Cooperating countries that implemented these
203.
Reto M. Hilty et al., Comments by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual
Property, Competition and Tax Law on the European Commission’s Green Paper:
Copyright in the Knowledge Economy (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual Prop.,
Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper No. 08-05, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1317730.
204.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 30. For further nuances concerning
derivative works and possible downstream applications to commercial products justifying
use of compensatory liability rules, see id. at 30–32.
205.
Id. at 30.
206.
See WCT, supra note 193, pmbl. & art. 10. The accompanying Agreed
Statement concerning Article 10 enables contracting parties “to carry forward and
appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and exceptions in their
national laws which have been considered acceptable under the Berne
Convention . . . [and] to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in
the digital network environment.”
207.
See Electronic Information for Libraries (eIFL), eIFL Handbook on Copyright
and Related Issues for Libraries, http://www.eifl.net/cps/sections/services/eifl-ip/issues/
handbook/handbook-e (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (listing Recommendations for a
Development Agenda in WIPO in order to foster “a greater understanding of the
importance of flexibilities, especially for developing and least-developed countries, and
balanced IP education to include copyright exceptions and limitations, library copyright

(4) REICHMAN

1156

12/22/2009 10:14:45 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[46:4

proposals could gradually build a contractually created space in
which their domestic arrangements accommodating science,
education, and libraries were given mutual and reciprocal
208
Equally essential are clear legal measures to
recognition.
enable the bulk purchasing of foreign educational texts on
209
reasonable terms and conditions.
The BRIC countries, together with governments in other
emerging economies, should also consider the potential
advantages of adopting a “fair use” provision that would enable
courts to deal with fact-specific situations falling outside the
codified exceptions to copyright law’s exclusive rights, which
invariably occur in practice. A fair use option would create a
buffer zone available when other provisions favoring research,
education, and libraries appeared unclear or uncertain and yet
the use in question served the larger public interest without
210
undue harm to authors.
Properly administered, a fair use provision could justify ad
hoc awards of compensation to resolve apparent conflicts between
private and public interests in hard cases. It would also help to
attenuate potential conflicts between copyright law’s exclusive
rights and fundamental human rights, especially free speech,
and the overriding “objectives and principles” of the TRIPS
211
Agreement, as set out in Articles 7 and 8.
However, implicit in any serious discussion of the trend
toward adopting “fair use” regimes outside the English-speaking
countries is the fundamental need to reconcile broad exceptions
in domestic copyright laws with the three-step test governing
212
limitations and exceptions in international copyright law, as
213
set out in Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement, and further
elucidated in Article 10 of the WCT (together with the relevant

issues, the public domain, fair model laws and pro-competitive licensing regimes”).
208.
Cf. Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 180 (proposing ceilings on exclusive rights of
authors); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 36, at 429 (discussing possible “treaties” between
universities to regulate the sharing of government-funded research data); Peter K. Yu,
Access to Medicines, BRIC Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AMER. J.L. & MED. 345, 345–
87 (2008) (proposing coordination strategies for BRIC countries to increase access to
medicines).
209.
See, e.g., Okediji, supra note 37, at 178–86.
210.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 26.
211.
Id. at 26–27; Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS
Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1006 (2009) (describing how these provisions may be
interpreted to facilitate development and to protect the public interest).
212.
Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Regime, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 149 (2000).
213.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13.
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214

Fortunately, the Max Planck
Agreed Statement thereto).
Institute, following exhaustive discussions among some thirty
experts, has prepared a Declaration on the Three-Step Test that
215
seeks to accomplish this task.
Building on the WCT
216
Preamble, it would:
− Mandate that courts applying the three-step test of
Article 13 in copyright cases take into account the interests
of third parties, including individual and collective interests
of the general public, and not just the interests of rights
217
owners;
− Avoid prioritizing any one step, or requiring that the
answer to all steps should be “yes,” but would instead require
a judicial balancing of the different prongs, as occurs under
218
U.S. fair use law;
− Give particular weight to unauthorized uses that are
219
underpinned by fundamental rights
and other “public

214.
WCT, supra note 193, art. 10 (reiterating the three-step test of TRIPS art. 13).
The accompanying Agreed Statement of the diplomatic conference that adopted the WCT
confirms that Article 10 allows signatories to “devise new” limitations and exceptions for
the digital environment. See supra note 206.
215.
Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 711–12.
216.
WCT, supra note 193, pmbl. (“Recognizing the need to maintain a balance
between the rights of authors and the larger public interest, particularly education,
research and access to information, as reflected in the Berne Convention.”).
217.
Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 712; cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10,
art. 30 (exceptions to exclusive rights of patentees).
218.
Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 709, 711. U.S. copyright law provides:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). But see MIHÁLY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE
INTERNET 91–92 (2002) (arguing that the legislative history of the Berne Convention
prohibits this approach).
219.
Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 712; see HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note
180, at 21 (describing some decisions in European courts that have allowed unauthorized
uses); LANGE & POWELL, supra note 181, at 126 (analyzing the tensions between the First
Amendment and copyright protection); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights
Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 1017 (2007) (“In
particular, there have been a number of decisions in the field of copyright in which the
freedom of expression has been invoked to justify a use that is not covered by an exception
provided for in the law.” (quoting Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard
for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 268, 277 (2004))).
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interests,” notably in scientific progress and cultural or
220
economic development;
− Seek to promote competition, especially in secondary
markets, by a correct balancing of interests, but without
221
making the three-step test a proxy for competition law; and
− Expressly recognize that adequate compensation may
be less than market pricing, where other public concerns are
at stake, including third party interests or the general public
222
interest.
The BRIC countries could set an example for other
developing countries by incorporating these proposals into their
domestic laws, by supporting their incorporation into the WIPO
Development Agenda, and, if necessary, by defending the tenets
of the Declaration in WTO dispute resolution proceedings if they
223
were challenged.
Finally, no reform of the copyright laws’ limitations and
exceptions would be worth much in practice if the resulting
provisions could not be enforced online or if publishers could
simply override them by contract. In regard to the online
environment, the WCT of 1996 clearly preserved a signatory
state’s rights to maintain all limitations and exceptions
“permitted by law” when implementing international obligations
to protect copyrightable works transmitted via digital networks
224
by means of TPMs and DRMs. However, the implementing
legislation in the United States, i.e., the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), declined to exercise this treaty-given
225
power, while the European Union’s implementing legislation,
226
the Infosoc Directive of 2001, simply avoided the issue, which
227
was tantamount to the same result.
Developing countries should take exactly the opposite path
by exercising the inherent power of WCT signatories to
implement all limitations and exceptions “permitted by law” in
228
the online environment. The first step is to enact legislation
that expressly applies limitations and exceptions favoring
scientific research, education, and libraries to works transmitted
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 712; see Chon, supra note 37, at 820.
Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 709–10.
Id. at 710.
See infra text accompanying notes 331–34.
See WCT, supra note 193, art. 11.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–05 (2006).
Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 6(4), 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC).
Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 180, at 1042–45.
WCT, supra note 193, art. 11.
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over digital networks, irrespective of the TPMs and DRMs that
otherwise regulate such transmissions. The next step is to
further adopt measures that effectively enable the beneficiaries
of these exceptions to enforce them despite the electronic fences
and digital locks that impair access to protected works in
229
cyberspace.
This result can be achieved, for example, by means of a
system of “electronic locks and keys” to break through the
230
electronic fences for specified purposes, or by resort to the less
costly and burdensome “reverse notice and takedown” procedure
that I and Professors Dinwoodie and Samuelson have proposed
231
elsewhere. The latter procedure enables would-be privileged
users to oblige copyright proprietors to make relevant materials
available without the users having to cross the electronic fence or
232
enter the digitally locked gateway at all.
Needless to say, neither approach will suffice if copyright
proprietors can override applicable limitations and exceptions by
contract, especially one-sided electronic contracts that regulate
lawful access to digitally transmitted works. Hence, developing
country legislators need to ensure that none of the key exceptions
favoring research, education, and libraries can be waived or
233
overridden by contract, especially in the online environment.
Arguably, it is the BRIC countries, and other emerging
economies, that have the greatest interest in treating access to
scientific knowledge and educational materials as a domestic and
global public good, one which should not be privatized beyond
234
limits set by domestic law and policy. While operating within

229.
See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345 (2004) (advocating
administrative measures to enforce limitations and exceptions online); Reichman,
Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 180, at 1003 (discussing the importance of a
commitment to ensuring that copyright limitations and exceptions are as available when
copyrighted works are protected by TPMs as when they are not).
230.
Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 34.
231.
Reichman, Dinwoodie & Samuelson, supra note 180, at 1032–38 (proposing
judicially enforceable measures to extract privileged matter without the user having to
enter digitally locked gateways).
232.
Id.
233.
See, e.g., Hilty et al., supra note 203, at 3; Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23,
at 36.
234.
See Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Political Economy of
Capabilities Accumulation: The Past and Future of Policies for Industrial Development, in
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAPABILITIES
ACCUMULATION 1, 4–5 (Mario Cimoli et al. eds., 2009); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a
Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 308 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999)
(advocating the perspective that knowledge is a public good that should be protected by
the state); cf. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 41–44.
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the confines of existing international intellectual property laws,
it behooves these countries—both at the domestic and regional
levels—to play a leadership role in implementing and amplifying
the flexibilities set out in the relevant international conventions,
with a view to benefiting their own research and educational
communities.
At the multilateral level, these countries should evaluate the
extent to which their own needs for access to knowledge oblige
them to support WIPO Development Agenda goals consonant with
those needs, in opposition to the high-protectionist policies favored
235
by the United States and the EU. Bold legislative initiatives in
domestic laws on these matters could thus help to set and define the
international copyright law agenda for the next several decades.
3. Measures Concerning Competition Law and Misuse.
There is nearly universal recognition of the need to redefine the
border between intellectual property rights and competition law
in a manner conducive to promoting worldwide markets for
236
technology.
Here the high- and middle-income developing
countries need to formulate competition laws and policies “to
ensure that foreign technologies and know-how flow to local
markets” under reasonable terms and conditions and at prices
237
local entrepreneurs can afford. In so doing, they should fully
exploit the competition law exceptions available under the TRIPS
238
Agreement and draw upon solutions and proposals emanating
235.
See supra text accompanying note 78; infra notes 301–03 and accompanying text.
236.
See, e.g., Josef Drexl, The Critical Role of Competition Law in Preserving Public
Goods in Conflict with Intellectual Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 2, at 709, 717–18; Eleanor M. Fox, Can Antitrust Policy Protect the Global
Commons from the Excesses of IPRs?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at
758, 767 (“In a world of global markets and world ramifications of local action, both
antitrust and intellectual property law cry out for global conceptions.”); see also Sean
Flynn, Aidan Hollis & Mike Palmedo, An Economic Justification for Open Access to
Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 191–93
(2009) (suggesting that developing countries adopt legal standards, especially competition
law doctrines, to drive down prices in competitive markets).
237.
Reichman, supra note 18, at 161.
238.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 8.2, 40. See Mark D. Janis, “Minimal”
Standards for Patent-Related Antitrust Law under TRIPS, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
REGIME, supra note 2, at 774, 776–80; Hanns Ullrich, Expansionist Intellectual Property
Protection and Reductionist Competition Rules: A TRIPS Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at 726, 730; see also Shubha Ghosh, Comment II:
Competitive Baselines for Intellectual Property Systems, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME,
supra note 2, at 793, 807–11 (concentrating on the possibilities afforded to members to
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from both past and present practices in OECD countries and
elsewhere, given the political will and skill to do so.
However, resorting to competition law and policy has so far
proved difficult for most developing countries. In part, this
reluctance may stem from the complex economic analysis, high
transaction costs, and regulatory skills associated with the
239
practice of competition law in the most developed countries.
Moreover, key differences between EU practice, which
emphasizes measures to prevent abuse of a dominant position,
and—until recently—the less aggressive stance of the U.S.
authorities, who seek evidence of actual or intended
240
monopolization, may hinder clear thinking about the relevant
problems in developing countries. Both the EU and U.S. regimes
depend on proof of market power, although long-standing (but
increasingly disfavored) common law precedents in patent law
allow U.S. courts to suspend enforcement of valid patents for acts
241
of “misuse,” even in the absence of market power.
Besides these technical intricacies, policymakers in
developing countries that become serious about the interface
between intellectual property and competition law must make
high-level decisions about the goals of competition law in general,
242
i.e., efficiency or fairness, or some combination of both. They
must then reconcile their versions of competition law with the
incentives to innovate that flow from the exclusive rights of
243
intellectual property laws. Here again they may be deterred by
prevailing tendencies in developed countries to view competition
law and intellectual property law as complementary means of

limit intellectual property rights through competition law and policy indirectly under
Articles 6, 13, 30, and 31 of the TRIPS Agreement).
239.
See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1979–2007 (examining the complex
historical enforcement of antitrust laws to protect intellectual property rights in the
United States).
240.
See Arezzo, supra note 133, at 458–65 (analyzing the differences between EU
and U.S. antitrust laws).
241.
Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1991–92 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme
Court’s diminishing hostility toward tying arrangements and “reduced concern about
anticompetitive effects” resulted in an “increasing insisten[ce] that market power be
explicitly proven”); see Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42–43 (2006)
(replacing the presumption of illegality in a tying arrangement involving a patented
product with the requirement of proof of power in the relevant market). See generally
Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007) (tracing the development of the
misuse doctrine).
242.
See Fox, supra note 236, at 768–69 (describing U.S. antitrust laws as being
guided by efficiency rather than fairness principles and suggesting that the goals would
coincide upon limiting immunities); Ullrich, supra note 238, at 747–48 (detailing the shift
of competition law enforcement toward efficiency-based innovation).
243.
See GHIDINI, supra note 109, at 114–15.
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mutually promoting social welfare, rather than as disparate
244
regimes in conflict with one another. The latter view more
readily supports doctrines that override intellectual property
rights, such as the “essential facilities” doctrine, much invoked in
European scholarship and much harder to obtain in practice than
245
in theory.
Although developing countries have lagged behind in this
field, both India and China have recently begun to formulate
competition law and policy with a view to circumscribing the
exclusive rights of intellectual property laws. For example, India
has adopted patent misuse provisions that limit a licensee’s
ability to acquire or use “any article other than the patented
article” or to use “any process other than the patented process,”
246
with a view to prohibiting any form of tying. Refusals to deal
may also trigger the grant of compulsory licenses under India’s
247
current framework,
as will undersupplying the market or
248
charging excessively high prices.
Similarly, China’s third amendment of its Patent Law
seems to have expressly codified the power to grant compulsory
licenses for abusive practices with regard to both patents and
utility models. Articles 48 through 54 reportedly envision a
compulsory license for abuse, including failure to work, within
the purview of Paris Convention Article 5A, or for
anticompetitive effects of the patent monopoly that “should be
249
reduced or removed.” Such a license may also issue, under
Article 54, for refusals to deal on reasonable terms or within a
250
reasonable period of time.

244.
See Drexl, supra note 236, at 716–17 (“In principle, IPRs and competition
laws . . . are two complementary instruments for the establishment and preservation of
competitive markets.”); Fox, supra note 236, at 764 (asserting that many nations’
antitrust laws are ineffective in policing monopolies granted by IPRs because they neither
prohibit excessive pricing nor recognize the refusal to license intellectual property as an
offense); Hovenkamp, supra note 2, at 1979 (explaining that while both IP and antitrust
policy seek to promote economic welfare, they do so in different ways, causing the relation
between the two to be “unstable and problematic”).
245.
See Coco, supra note 133, at 20; Frischmann & Weber Waller, supra note 110, at
57–64 (discussing the European cases).
246.
Kapczynski, supra note 4 (quoting The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of
Parliament, 1970, § 140(iii)); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of
the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2009) (rejecting
efficiency claims and demonstrating how tying generally harms consumer welfare).
247.
The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 84(6)(ii), (iv), as
amended by The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002.
248.
The Patents Act, 1970, No. 39, Acts of Parliament, 1970, § 84, as amended by The
Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 38, Acts of Parliament, 2002; Kapczynski, supra note 4.
249.
See Feng, supra note 9, at 99–102.
250.
Id. at 100.
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The measures adopted in India and China may serve to
stimulate other emerging economies that have so far played
virtually no formative role in this area at all. If so, developing
countries may also discover needed self-help measures that
competition law might afford if and when market failures of
various kinds impede access to green technologies, as many fear
251
will occur.
Policymakers should accordingly consider early U.S. cases
252
that emphasize fairness over efficiency. They should also adopt
both the “abuse of a dominant position” approach found in EU
competition law and flexible doctrines of “patent misuse,” which
could reach refusals to deal, excessive prices, and undersupply of
253
the market, without a showing of market power. But such
measures must be applied equally to domestic and foreign firms,
254
without discrimination, which could raise serious obstacles in
many emerging economies.
C. Revitalizing a Petrified Intellectual Property System
The foregoing exercise attempted to illustrate how the
BRIC countries and other emerging economies could forge
needed solutions to bourgeoning intellectual property problems
that developed countries have either neglected or failed to
resolve. In this endeavor, BRIC countries would be motivated by
the greater stake they now have in what Carolyn Deere has
255
felicitously called the “Implementation Game,”
owing to
steadily mounting payoffs from strategic uses of locally
generated knowledge goods. By carefully reevaluating their own
intellectual property needs in the light of growing technological

251.
See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 40, at 20; Maskus & Okediji, supra note 40, at 7–8;
Reichman et al., supra note 40, at 28–33.
252.
See Fox, supra note 236, at 760–61.
253.
See Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 5A; G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO
THE A PPLICATION OF THE P ARIS C ONVENTION FOR THE P ROTECTION OF I NDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY AS REVISED AT S TOCKHOLM IN 1967, at 70–71 (1968) (pointing out
flexibilities in the Paris Convention allowing nations to define and legislate against
abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by a
patent); Cotter, supra note 241, at 908–09; see also Reichman with Hasenzahl, supra
note 111, at 21 (noting U.S. practice of nonenforcement, used to correct misuses of
exclusive rights).
254.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 3, 4, 8.2, 40 (requiring members to
accord no less favorable treatment to other members with regard to the protection of
intellectual property); Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 2(1) (declaring that nationals
of any country of the Union shall have the same protection and legal remedy with regard
to industrial property as in any of other countries of the Union).
255.
See DEERE, supra note 30, at 3.
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256

capacities, they could begin to overhaul and reshape an “out of
257
balance” system driven by ideology and power politics in order
to address the real conditions of creativity and innovation in
258
today’s digitally empowered universe of scientific discourse.
Once embarked along such a path, policymakers in these
countries would discover the growing importance of publicly
accessible infrastructure in the development of new and complex
259
technological paradigms. They would profit from the problemsolving capacities of liability rules, especially when applied to
upstream research outputs and tools that lack clear market
values and that lend themselves to multiple downstream
260
applications of unknown or uncertain value. They would strive
for more fluid and balanced interchanges between public and
private goods in knowledge economies driven by both heavy
public investment in basic research and by private investment in
261
translating that research into workable commercial products.
256.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 7 (stressing policy space within TRIPS
flexibilities to promote local creative and technological skills).
257.
For evidence of the Andean Community’s successful efforts in this regard, see
Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 16–36.
258.
See David, supra note 72, at 82 (arguing that the Hopi word koyaanisqatsi,
meaning “life out of balance,” can be used to describe the international regime of
intellectual property rights due to the “dangerously altered . . . balance between private
rights and the public domain in data and information”).
259.
See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 64, at 923–26 (developing a theory that strong
economic arguments exist for managing and sustaining openly accessible intellectual
infrastructure); Lee, Contracting to Preserve, supra note 73, at 893–94 (suggesting that
public institutions have freedom to effectuate norms favoring wide dissemination of
research technologies through a new model of “consideration-based patent regulation”);
Lee, Distributive Commons, supra note 73, at 21–22 (comparing health technologies to
infrastructure). See generally BENKLER, supra note 176, at 3 (claiming that the
information economy is entering a new stage, which he calls the “networked information
economy”).
260.
See, e.g., REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, ch. 2
(proposing compensatory liability regime for commercial applications of materials
deposited for research purposes in culture collections); Victoria Henson-Apollonio, The
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA):
The Standard Material Transfer Agreement as Implementation of a Limited
Compensatory Liability Regime, in GENE PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING
MODELS, supra note 24, at 289, 289–93 (describing recent effort to facilitate the
exchange of crop germplasm for commercial food and agricultural purposes through
compensatory liability regimes); Rai et al., supra note 132, at 26 (proposing liability
rule for pre-competitive pooling of small molecule libraries for high throughput
screening); Reichman & Lewis, supra note 159, at 345–48 (proposing use of liability
rules to stimulate investment in traditional knowledge). See generally Reichman, supra
note 53, at 1776–77 (proposing compensatory liability regime for small-scale
innovation).
261.
See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 300–01; So et al., supra note 41, at
2078–82 (describing the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and examining the potential problems for
developing countries modeling legislation on the Act); V.C. Vivekanandan, The Public–
Private Dichotomy of Intellectual Property: Recommendations for the WIPO Development
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And they could play a unique role in developing global
262
administrative law norms as well.
In sum, the BRIC countries, pursuing their own self-interest
263
in economic growth with suitable coordination strategies, could
conceivably break the maximalists’ stranglehold on intellectual
property lawmaking exercises, which aims mainly to preserve a
“knowledge cartel’s” comparative advantage in existing
technological outputs at the expense of future innovation
264
requiring more subtle forms of nurture. In so doing, the BRIC
countries would devise and test new approaches and solutions
that could redound to the benefit of technology-exporting
countries everywhere, most of which seem incapable of reforming
their increasingly dysfunctional innovation systems at the
265
present time.
IV. OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING
“COUNTER-HARMONIZATION” INITIATIVES
The question this optimistic portrait begs, however, is why
developing countries have not already taken longer strides in this
direction when implementing their responses to the challenges
posed after the 1994 adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Carolyn
Deere’s recent efforts to answer that very question afford a bleak
and cautionary picture of the obstacles that stand in the way of
266
autonomous intellectual property reforms.
She shows, for example, that strong economic pressures,
including the threat of trade sanctions and other diplomatic
measures, combined with offers of future trade concessions, were
more likely to produce TRIPS-plus provisions in FTAs than
efforts to flesh out existing flexibilities in the TRIPS
267
Agreement.
High-level lobbying by specialized knowledge
communities, backed by one-sided technical assistance from

Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 131, 132–34.
262.
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 21–25.
263.
See, e.g., Yu, supra note 208, at 370–83 (stressing coordination strategies such
as South-South Alliances, North-South Cooperation, and use of the WTO Dispute
Settlement Process); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 17–21 (stressing importance of
coordination in international lawmaking exercises concerning IPRs in general).
264.
Maskus & Reichman, supra note 2, at 3, 19.
265.
Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 122–29.
266.
See generally DEERE, supra note 30 (revealing the international pressures and
national political dynamics which resulted in the variation of responses to TRIPS in
developing countries).
267.
Id. at 164–67.
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268

WIPO and government agencies in developed countries, further
“shap[ed] developing country perceptions of the political climate
269
although
and their room for [maneuvering] within it,”
countervailing efforts by NGOs, academics, and others became
270
more effective over time.
On the domestic front, a lack of technical expertise
271
hampered many developing countries. As Professor Dreyfuss
observes, “Astute lawyers should be able to utilize these [TRIPS]
flexibilities . . . . The rub, however, is the need for astute
lawyering . . . [which in turn depends on nurturing] a legal
community capable of utilizing the Agreement’s flexibilities
272
effectively.”
Even when the relevant expertise emerged over time, the
lack of internal government coordination among agencies affected
by intellectual property law and policy left too much power in the
hands of national IP offices, which were more likely to share the
views of their foreign counterparts, and also left non-expert
government officials more vulnerable to pressures from foreign
273
governments.
In many developing countries, parliamentary
debate and public discussion about intellectual property issues
were negligible, which delegated policy framing to “national

268.
See, e.g., SISULE F. MUSUNGU & GRAHAM DUTFIELD, MULTILATERAL
AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANISATION (WIPO) 16–17 (2003), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/
economic/Issues/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.
269.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 167–68, 180 (emphasizing ideational power as an
explanation to the varying actions of developing countries and describing capacitybuilding as the area of clearest intersection between economic and ideational power in the
TRIPS implementation game); see also DRAHOS WITH BRAITHWAITE, supra note 12, at 90–
93; GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 12
(2000) (attributing the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement, “given the ambivalent if not
hostile stance of many developing countries,” to the promise of favorable agreements in
areas such as textiles and agriculture); Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in
Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 803–04 (2001) (revealing the danger
of developing countries “being led into a highly complex multilateral/bilateral web” that is
eroding their ability to set and interpret intellectual property standards domestically).
270.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 172–79; see also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:
The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property
Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 23–27 (2004) (observing that NGOs and developing
countries began to regard TRIPS as a “coerced agreement” and describing how, in the
wake of TRIPS, NGOs aided developing nations in intellectual property lawmaking).
271.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 197. In Africa, this lack of expertise at the national
level led to the delegation of intellectual property matters to regional entities that were
particularly susceptible to high-protectionist pressures from WIPO and OECD countries
generally. See id. at 219–20.
272.
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 7.
273.
See DEERE, supra note 30, at 211–20; see also Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 16–
32 (documenting more successful regional coordination efforts in the Andean
Community).
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associations of patent and trademark agents and copyright
lawyers, staff of national intellectual property offices, and
274
Weak governance and widespread
national legal scholars.”
corruption were, of course, ancillary factors in most of the
275
developing world, with some notable exceptions in the Andean
276
Community.
One may then ask why matters should be different in the
future. The answer is largely rooted in the real economic and
technological capacities being attained in countries such as India,
China, Brazil, and others. Such real world experience breeds,
first, greater awareness of both the strengths and weaknesses of
conventional intellectual property norms and policies
encountered along the way, and second, a greater confidence in
the ability of local entrepreneurs and policymakers to tailor
277
future decisions and positions in their national interest.
There is, of course, a countervailing risk that greater
technical capacity at the national level, especially in the BRIC
countries, could breed domestic lobbying pressures favoring
protectionist measures that might further distort, rather than
278
rebalance, the international intellectual property system. Also
relevant is the continued ability of NGO advocacy initiatives,

274.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 207. Professor Gervais points to the perception of
arcane “club” rules beyond the written word of the treaties, with the risk that the
intellectual property club can create distance between policy makers and their country’s
larger public interest. E-mail from Daniel Gervais, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
University Law School, to Jerome Reichman, Professor of Law, Duke University School of
Law (Sept. 14, 2009) (on file with Author).
275.
See DEERE, supra note 30, at 198 (noting the impact of weak public
administration and corruption on TRIPS implementation in developing countries).
276.
See Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 16–32.
277.
See, e.g., GORDON C.K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 63–
82 (2009) (describing the quantitative and legal measures taken by the Chinese
government to counteract rampant counterfeiting of intellectual property); Allarakhia,
supra note 178, at 11 (“As economies in emerging markets enter the biopharmeceutical
arena, it is essential that developed economies share not only technological expertise, but
also their experiences regarding knowledge production and dissemination.”); Mizukami &
Lemos, supra note 33, at 44–45 (analyzing the tecnobrega industry in Brazil and its
implications for intellectual property protection); Yu, supra note 208, at 346–48 (exploring
how the BRIC countries can “promote access to essential medicines in the less developed
world” through collaboration with other developing countries); see also Shamnad Basheer
& Annalisa Primi, The WIPO Development Agenda: Factoring in the “Technologically
Proficient” Developing Countries, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 100, 101–04 (cautioning
against a polarized view of developing countries in the context of technological capability);
Pedro Paranaguá, Strategies to Implement WIPO’s Development Agenda: A Brazilian
Perspective and Beyond, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 140, 140–42 (focusing on the
role of NGOs in implementing the WIPO Development Agenda).
278.
I am indebted to Laurence Helfer for this cautionary note.
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to reach
such as the Access to Knowledge Campaign,
policymakers in developing country capitals, despite funding cuts
due to economic recession and to pressures from high-protectionist
interests on foundations previously supportive of such initiatives.
Of particular importance are the lessons to be learned from
the coordination and governance strategies of those BRIC
countries that have most succeeded in resisting foreign pressures
for TRIPS-plus agreements and legislation while maintaining an
280
increasingly autonomous policy of their own. Here empirical
evidence showing the ability of Andean Community institutions
to resist attempts to influence the formation of regional
intellectual property laws and policies on numerous occasions
281
sets an impressive example. But regional coordination, a key
aspect of Professor Kapczynski’s own “counter-harmonization”
282
strategy, is often difficult to achieve and risks becoming fragile
283
over time. Moreover, that very regional process can be captured
and turned against the interests of national innovation systems
needing broadened TRIPS flexibilities, as Carolyn Deere
284
documents in the case of francophone Africa.
To offset these risks, Professor Kapczynski buttresses her
“counter-harmonization” thesis with supplementary strategies of
285
“fragmentation” and “mimicry.”
Fragmentation entails “the
adoption of unique or semi-unique national variations in law that
create legal ‘friction,’ impeding the flow of the transnational
286
circuits” that undermine local autonomy. Mimicry, in contrast,
entails “a dynamic reworking” of transplanted IP norms, which is
287
cast as a process of “sharing or borrowing.”
For these and other related proposals to succeed, however, at
least three supporting institutional factors become relevant, if

279.
See, e.g., Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge, supra note 196; Paranaguá, supra
note 277.
280.
See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 30, at 199, 211–18 (describing Brazil as “the country
that exhibited the highest degree of coordination domestically on IP policy matters and
that also achieved the greatest coordination of its external IP relations”).
281.
See Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 16–32.
282.
Kapczynski, supra note 4; see also Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 177–
22 (suggesting new approaches to existing IP problems rather than premature patent
harmonization efforts).
283.
For example, the Andean Community has lost Venezuela and Bolivia, and may
be disintegrating. See Helfer et al., supra note 47.
284.
See, e.g., DEERE, supra note 30, at 240–86 (describing experience of the African
Organization for Intellectual Property (OAPI)).
285.
Kapczynski, supra note 4.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.; see also Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in International Copyright:
Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994).
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not indispensable. These are: 1) the need for interagency
coordination at the national, and, ideally, regional levels; 2) the
need to establish facts on the ground in the domestic laws of the
emerging economies; and 3) the willingness of the relevant
governments to defend national variations of TRIPS flexibilities
before WTO dispute resolution tribunals.
A. Interagency Coordination of Intellectual Property Law and
Policy
In the late 1990s, under a seed grant from a unit of UNDP,
Ruth Okediji, Jayasharee Watal, and I argued that internal
governmental coordination of intellectual property policy would
be crucial to formulating appropriate domestic strategies to
implement international intellectual property standards under
288
the TRIPS Agreement. Because, in our view, these new IP
standards would affect all of a country’s creative and industrial
sectors in different ways, depending on its specific national
assets and liabilities in each sector, there could be no internal
“one size fits all” solutions, despite external pressures for such an
289
approach. Rather, the challenge for governments was to take
stock of those same national assets and liabilities and then to
fashion implementing strategies that would enable each
developing country to maximize potential gains from intellectual
290
property protection over time while minimizing the social costs.
Our central recommendation was accordingly that
developing country governments needed to form and staff
ongoing interagency coordinating committees on intellectual
property law and policy, in order to advise policymakers about
the implications for economic and social welfare as a whole of
every proposed legislative or administrative decision concerning
291
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement and related issues.
Above all, it seemed essential that these local coordinating
committees would oversee the activities of national intellectual
property offices, while pooling their resources at the regional
level, in order to maintain coherent and effective negotiating
288.
See Jerome Reichman, Jayasharee Watal & Ruth Ghana Okediji, Flagship
Project on Innovation, Culture, Biogenetic Resources, and Traditional Knowledge, U.N.
Development Programme (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).
289.
See generally Basheer & Primi, supra note 277.
290.
Reichman, Watal & Okediji, supra note 288; see also Chon, supra note 37, at
806–20 (probing the relationship between IP law and social justice); Maskus & Reichman,
supra note 2, at 24 (“These countries can hardly absorb the unknown social costs of new
intellectual property burdens when the real costs of the last round of legislative initiatives
are still making themselves felt.”).
291.
See Reichman, Watal & Okediji, supra note 288.
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positions in the relevant multilateral fora, including WIPO,
292
WTO, WHO, UNCTAD, and UNESCO.
To their credit, UNCTAD sponsored a conference in Ghana at
which some sixteen delegations from different countries evaluated
these proposals. Notwithstanding the attending delegations’
enthusiastic endorsement of these proposals, and UNCTAD’s
strong commitment to promoting their implementation, further
UNDP funding was denied. The project was soon abandoned, in
part because some high-level UNDP officials thought that
developing countries should work to repeal the TRIPS Agreement
rather than to comply with it, and in part—one suspects—due to
pressures on UNDP from key donor countries to steer clear of
controversial intellectual property matters.
In retrospect, both Carolyn Deere’s and Laurence Helfer’s
empirical findings demonstrate the validity of the proposals for
interagency coordination that were put forward in the late 1990s
and the extent to which such recommendations still remain
relevant to today’s counter-harmonization strategies, including
efforts to implement the WIPO Development Agenda. Deere’s
study shows that those BRIC countries that were most successful
in defining and maintaining autonomous intellectual property
policies and positions over time, especially India and Brazil,
despite enormous pressures from foreign governments, were
precisely those countries that had highly developed interagency
293
coordination mechanisms in place early on.
In this connection, it is worth noting that China’s third
amendment of its Patent Law in 2008, which self-consciously
seeks to balance incentives to innovate with the larger public
interest, was the product of a high-level policymaking group
charged with the formulation of a National Intellectual Property
294
Strategy.

292.
See Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for Development, in
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, supra note 78, at 79, 90–93 (”Regional or pro-development fora are particularly
effective means for coordinating efforts by less developed countries in the areas of public
health, IP, and international trade.”).
293. With the exception of a handful of countries, like Brazil and India, the
prospect of tailored approaches to TRIPS implementation was curtailed by the
absence of a broader policy framework setting out national needs and priorities
through which reform options could be considered. . . . Among developing
countries, Brazil stood out for having a strategic approach to TRIPS
implementation based on a broad policy framework for development and
associated industrial policies. India also worked to place IP issues within a
broader policy framework through its five-year plans.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 199.
294.
Feng, supra note 9, at 10–11.
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Elsewhere, Professor Helfer’s research team shows that the
Andean Community’s own intellectual property rules
significantly influenced the expectations and behavior of private
295
actors. By the same token, the Andean Tribunal of Justice
(ATJ) not only created the kind of procedures and standards
familiar in well-functioning legal systems, it “helped to rebuff
pressure by the United States and multinational corporations to
circumvent Andean IP rules, leading to different behavior by
national actors from what it would have been in the absence of
296
the Andean legal system.”
In contrast, most other governments delegated the task of
responding to TRIPS and drafting the relevant laws to a small
staff of technocrats located in national intellectual property
297
offices. Carried to the regional level in Africa, for example, this
meant that national intellectual property policies were largely
delegated to the African Intellectual Property Organization
(OAPI) and to the African Regional Intellectual Property
Organization (ARIPO) (English-speaking countries). Both
entities worked closely with WIPO and left few countries at the
national level with sufficient “capacity . . . to critically review
298
patents granted,” among other policy issues.
Of course, the successes attained in India, Brazil, and China
were also due to the economic opportunities their large markets
offered to foreign investors, irrespective of their own intellectual
299
property laws and policies. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
without effective interagency coordination of these issues at the
domestic level, developing countries will not attain the leadership
role in intellectual property policymaking at the international
300
level to which they otherwise could and should aspire.

295.
296.
297.

Helfer et al., supra note 47, at 17–32.
Id. at 17.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 199; see, e.g., COMM’N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS,
INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 5 (2003),
available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf;
Carlos Correa, Formulating Effective Pro-development National Intellectual Property
Strategies, in TRADING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY 209, 214 (Christophe Bellman et al. eds., 2003) (“Due to their limited
domestic capacity, developing countries are strongly dependent on technical assistance, and
rely for expert advice and commentary on new draft legislation on the [WIPO] and the [WTO],
especially to conform consistency of draft legislation with international obligations.”).
298.
DEERE, supra note 30, at 219.
299.
See Yu, supra note 8, at 177–80.
300.
For the view that the United States’ own interagency review mechanisms no longer
meet today’s needs for a vibrant and effective innovation policy, see Stuart Minor Benjamin &
Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–8
(2008) (highlighting “certain well-established pathologies of the regulatory state”).
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B. Establishing Facts on the Ground
The Development Agenda, now officially established at
301
WIPO and analogous forums at other institutions, such as the
302
303
IGWG deliberations at WHO
and their progeny,
have
changed the policy climate at the international level. They
elevate the concerns of developing countries, as well as the
broader constituencies in developed countries that they indirectly
304
represent, to a level of importance that cannot be ignored. They
make the implementation of the flexibilities set out in the TRIPS
Agreement and in other intellectual property conventions as
much a matter of legitimate multilateral concern as compliance
with proprietors’ exclusive rights.
In this respect, users’ rights and other third party interests,
including the larger public interest in research, education, and
access to knowledge, have become an integral part of the relevant

301.
WIPO, General Report Adopted by the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO,
at 135–47, WIPO Doc. A/43/16 (Nov. 12, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/
mdocs/govbody/en/a_43/a_43_16-main1.pdf; see, e.g., Denis Borges Barbosa, Margaret
Chon & Andrés Moncayo von Hase, Slouching Towards Development in International
Intellectual Property, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 71, 120–23 (addressing the purpose and
constraints of the WIPO Development Agenda); de Beer, supra note 78, at 1–2.
302.
World Health Org. [WHO], Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHO Doc. WHA 61.21 (May 24, 2008), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf (building upon the report of
the Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual
Property).
303.
See, e.g., WHO, Draft Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property: Mapping the Funding for Research and Development
for Neglected Diseases, WHO Doc. A/PHI/IGWG/2/INF.DOC./2 (Aug. 28, 2007), available
at http://apps.who.int/gb/phi/pdf/igwg2/PHI_IGWG2_ID2-en.pdf (reporting on the funding
for health research and development of research related to neglected diseases); WHO,
STRENGTHENING HEALTH SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE HEALTH OUTCOMES: WHO’S FRAMEWORK
FOR ACTION 1–5 (2007), available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/Health_Systems_
EverybodyBusinessHSS.pdf (noting the unacceptable health outcomes across the
developing world and providing a framework to strengthen health systems to reverse this
trend); WHO, EQUITABLE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: A FRAMEWORK FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–6 (2004), available at http://archives.who.int/tbs/ndp/s4962e.pdf
(proposing actions for policymakers to take to improve access to existing essential
medicines and vaccines).
304.
See, e.g., Carolyn Deere, Reforming Governance to Advance the WIPO
Development Agenda, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 43, 43–46 (critically evaluating
WIPO’s governance); Xuan Li, A Conceptual and Methodological Framework for Impact
Assessment Under the WIPO Development Agenda (Cluster D), in IMPLEMENTING THE
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78,
at 34, 40; see also E. Richard Gold & Jean-Frédéric Morin, From Agenda to
Implementation: Working Outside the WIPO Box, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, supra note 78, at 57,
64–66 (encouraging WIPO to outsource the implementation of the Development
Agenda).

(4) REICHMAN

12/22/2009 10:14:45 PM

ST

2009] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 21 CENTURY

1173

international intellectual property standards set out in these
305
Moreover, by linking the larger development
conventions.
component to questions of enforcing intellectual property
standards at the international level, the Development Agenda
and IGWG-related consultations make it mandatory for both
IGOs and national delegations to take into account the
306
countervailing demands of the human rights conventions, as
well as the expressly designated objectives and principles codified
307
in Articles 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.
Yet, nothing is cheaper than talk at IGOs. The prospects of
top-down multilateral legislation mandating hard law provisions
favoring the interests of developing countries are virtually nil at
the present time, given the governance structure of these
organizations and the hostility of the United States, European
Union, and Japan to any such initiatives. Whether soft law
308
reforms stand a better chance of approval remains to be seen,
including the social costs of any trade-offs that would have to be
made in order to win the assent of the aforementioned developed
309
countries.
Meanwhile, secret provisions likely to be incorporated into
the pending Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)

305.
See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 180, at 9–15 (suggesting that
international harmonization of limitations and exceptions in copyright law would enhance
the benefits of substantive rights harmonization); Dreyfuss, supra note 180, at 22
(making a case for adding explicit user rights to the TRIPS Agreement); Annette Kur &
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough—The Notion of Binding Ceilings in
International Intellectual Property Protection 19–25 (Max Planck Inst. for Intellectual
Prop., Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-01, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429; Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 1 (observing the
need for the “Three-Step Test” to be interpreted “so as to ensure a proper and balanced
application of limitations and exceptions”).
306.
See Laurence R. Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or
Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 55–57 (2003) (discussing the “antagonistic
approach to TRIPS” taken by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights in Resolution 2000/7 on Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights);
Helfer, supra note 219, at 1009–14; see also JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 304–05, 309 (2003) (discussing the Vienna Convention’s
objective of prohibiting agreements that affect the rights or obligations of third parties,
which extends to those agreements that “detract[ ] from substantive human rights”);
Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Bürgi, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005).
307.
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, arts. 7–8; see generally Yu, supra note 211.
308.
See HUGENHOLTZ & OKEDIJI, supra note 180, at 49–50 (expounding the benefits
of a soft-law modality).
309.
For example, while expanded protection for Geographical Indications and
perhaps some forms of traditional knowledge might become acceptable to both sides,
proposals for database protection or deep patent law harmonization would almost
certainly cost developing countries far more than any gains from greater recognition of socalled user rights. See Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 93–94.
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310

negotiations could undo key provisions of the Doha Declaration
311
EU customs
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.
officials are further undermining access to medicines by
intercepting shipments of unpatented generic pharmaceuticals
312
from India to developing countries in other continents. And
WIPO has hosted a major conference to convince least-developed
countries, such as Haiti, that their future economic prospects
depend on stronger intellectual property laws, which they are
313
otherwise not obliged to enact until at least 2013.
What must occur, instead, if the WIPO Development Agenda
314
is to produce more than talk,
is that leading developing
countries, especially the BRIC countries, take steps to implement
model TRIPS-compliant flexibilities in their own domestic laws,
while championing these same positions in the relevant
international fora. China, for example, has articulated the
“public order” exception to patentability under Article 27.2 of the
TRIPS Agreement to exclude “any invention-creation that is
contrary to the laws of the State or social morality or that is
315
detrimental to the public interest.” Building on this provision,
China’s third revision of its Patent Law regulates access to
316
genetic resources for the first time; imposes a “prior informed

310.
See generally Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA): Two Tales of a Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235 (2009) (describing what
is known of the closed-door trade negotiations surrounding ACTA, an agreement
ostensibly aimed at fighting the proliferation of counterfeit and pirated goods in
international trade).
311.
See Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 31.
312.
Posting of Tom Bollyky, Terminology Matters: The Dispute Between India and
EU over Generic Drug Transshipments, to Global Health Policy Blog (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globalhealth/2009/08/terminology-matters-the-dispute-betweenindia-and-eu-over-generic-drug-transshipments.php; Kaitlin Mara, Drug Seizures in
Frankfurt Spark Fears of EU-Wide Pattern, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, June 5, 2009,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/06/05/drug-seizures-in-frankfurt-spark-fears-of-euwide-pattern; see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 966 (reporting that the EU
had been “effectively seeking to burden” countries with “the duty to implement the terms
of its Intellectual Property Enforcement Directive,” by ordering provisional measures such
as “the physical seizure of infringing goods”).
313.
See supra note 31.
314.
See Pedro de Paranaguá Moniz, The Development Agenda for WIPO: Another
Stillbirth? A Battle Between Access to Knowledge and Enclosure 41–42 (July 1, 2005)
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Queen Mary & Westfield College), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=844366 (criticizing long discussions as irrelevant to the main goals of the
Development Agenda).
315.
See Wenting Cheng, Third Revision of Patent Law in China (Part II), INTELL.
PROP. WATCH, Oct. 1, 2009, http://ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/10/01/third-revision-of-patentlaw-in-china-part-ii.
316.
Id. Draft regulations define “genetic resources” as any material that “is obtained
from the human body, animals, plants or micro-organism, contains a genetic functional
unit, and is of actual or potential value.” Inventions subject to the provision “make . . . use
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consent regime” consistent with the Convention on Biological
317
Diversity; and makes disclosure of origin a precondition for the
granting of any patented invention “depending on genetic
318
resources.” These provisions were adopted to deal with the
problem of “biopiracy” and modeled on similar legislation in the
319
Andean Community and India.
In contrast with these palpable concerns about protecting
potentially valuable genetic resources, the BRIC countries as a
group lag behind in recognizing impediments to computational
research methods and innovation that lie hidden in obsolete
320
copyright regimes. For example, nothing prevents Brazil, India,
and China from proceeding on their own to codify broad
limitations and exceptions for digitally integrated scientific
research, education, and libraries in their domestic laws, as
321
stepping stones to broader international action. By the same
token, courts or legislatures in these and other countries could
begin to implement the Max Planck Institute’s Declaration on
322
the Three-Step Test in their domestic laws, along with selected
other “ceilings” on intellectual property rights that have emerged
323
from parallel initiatives in the Nordic countries.
Only if leading developing countries begin to enact suitable
reforms of intellectual property law and policy at home will it
of the genetic function of genetic resources.” Id.
317.
Id.; see Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 1, 15–16, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, 143 (promoting the “sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of
research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources”).
318.
Cheng, supra note 315.
319.
See Feng, supra note 9, at 63–64. In China, unauthorized exports of genetic
materials from wild soybeans, local gooseberry varieties, “and even the famous Beijing
duck” had allegedly led to the development of hybrids patented abroad that were
subsequently imported into China. Cheng, supra note 315.
320.
See supra text accompanying notes 200–05 (suggesting that developing countries
adopt broad exemptions aimed at promoting scientific research uses of literature and data).
See generally REICHMAN, DEDEURWAERDERE & UHLIR, supra note 73, chs. 3–4.
321.
See, e.g., Reichman & Okediji, supra note 23, at 39; Three-Step Test, supra note
180, at 3 (prefacing that individual states should have flexibility to shape their own
copyright laws and stating that the three-step test should not undermine European
legislation on limitations); see also Andrew Rens, Implementing WIPO’s Development
Agenda: Treaty Provisions on Minimum Exceptions and Limitations for Education, in
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA, supra note 78, at 158, 160–61 (pointing out that “[e]xceptions and limitations
already exist in the laws of most developed countries and many developing countries” and,
in particular, arguing for copyright exceptions for educational purposes). But lobbying
pressures against change in the pending Brazilian copyright reform are reportedly fierce,
according to confidential top-level sources.
322.
See Three-Step Test, supra note 180, at 3 (“[T]he Test may be incorporated directly
or it may function exclusively as an aid to the interpretation of domestic legislation.”).
323.
See Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 305, at 26 n.89.
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become realistically possible to foresee these reforms spreading
to the regional and multilateral levels, where both positive and
negative results of such experiments could be evaluated. Just as
the AIPPI forums in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries shed a comparative light on state practice in developed
countries and led to the progressive harmonization of inventors’
324
rights over time, so, too, can the WIPO Development Agenda
become a focal point for comparing and contrasting diverse state
actions on the road to achieving a new and better equilibrium
between private and public goods at the national, regional, and
multilateral levels.
Meanwhile, still other worthwhile initiatives can be rooted
in state practice without formal acquiescence at IGOs. For
example, there are now real prospects for an international treaty
325
providing greater access to literature for the blind, a process
that is long overdue and worthy of strong support by all WIPO
member countries. At the same time, nothing stops the
developing countries from immediately codifying key provisions
of this proposed treaty in order to create “facts on the ground”
that would benefit the blind now and pave the way for future
enactment in the WIPO framework.
Similarly, if a prize fund to promote research on a vaccine
326
for Chagas disease is a good idea, as the evidence suggests,
then the Latin American countries should establish such a fund
now, with their own contributions, and shame the developed
countries into joining them later. In other words, the more that
the developing countries are willing to stand up for their own
intellectual property needs, the more likely they are to ensure
that those needs will be respected in future international
intellectual property lawmaking exercises.
C. Defending the TRIPS Flexibilities at the WTO
Moving beyond talk will not become feasible unless
developing countries are willing to defend their rights to
324.
See LADAS, supra note 44, at 63–94 (chronicling the development of the Paris
Convention).
325.
WIPO, Treaty for Improved Access for Blind, Visually Impaired and Other
Reading Disabled Persons, Annex, WIPO Doc. SCCR/18/5 (May 25, 2009), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_18/sccr_18_5.pdf (proposal put forward
by Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay based on recommendations of the World Blind Union);
William New, Proposed WIPO Treaty on Visually Impaired Access Gets Deeper Look,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, May 29, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/05/29/
proposed-wipo-treaty-on-visually-impaired-access-gets-deeper-look.
326.
See Sara E. Crager & Matt Price, Prizes and Parasites: Incentive Models for
Addressing Chagas Disease, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 292, 300–01 (2009).
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implement the TRIPS flexibilities in their own domestic laws
without undue interference from powerful states that espouse
conflicting interpretations of international IP standards. The
more that single states, such as the BRIC countries, or regional
coalitions, take steps to fully implement limitations and
exceptions to the exclusive rights covered by the TRIPS
Agreement, for example, the more likely it becomes that
governments in developed countries will contest the legality of
such actions through diplomatic representations and threats of
retaliatory measures.
The USTR has repeatedly used actions under Section 301 of
327
the Trade Act of 1974
to challenge developing country
governments’ interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement, in
combination with threats to withdraw GSP privileges in
328
reprisal. These tactics aimed to keep developing countries from
using compulsory licenses to persuade pharmaceutical companies
to market patented medicines on a “high-volume low-margin”
329
330
basis rather than at prices only the affluent can afford.
Unless public officials in developing countries are willing to
stand up for their rights under the TRIPS Agreement and related
331
conventions before the TRIPS Council and, where necessary, in
332
WTO dispute-resolution proceedings, they will not retain the
327.
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041–42 (1975)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2006)).
328.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 3, 17, 23
(2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%20Version%20of%20the%
202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPORT.pdf (noting that Argentina and Brazil
appear on the Priority Watch and Watch Lists, respectively, as targets for
enforcement through trade preference programs such as the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP)).
329.
See Bird, supra note 47, at 210, 214 (“[L]icenses invite scrutiny by wealthy
governments ready to defend their multinationals through trade sanctions. . . . Evidence
certainly exists that compulsory licensing, or even the threat of compulsory licensing, can
lower drug prices dramatically.”); Kristina M. Lybecker & Elisabeth Fowler, Compulsory
Licensing in Canada and Thailand: Comparing Regimes to Ensure Legitimate Use of the
WTO Rules, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 233 (2009); see also Abbott & Reichman, supra
note 38, at 929–30; Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPs, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs
in the Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 224 (2004); Outterson, supra
note 38, at 229–30.
330.
See Flynn, Hollis & Palmedo, supra note 236, at 186 (describing the use of
monopoly pricing in under-developed pharmaceutical markets).
331.
See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 68; Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization art. IV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) (designating the roles and duties of the TRIPS Council).
332.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU].

(4) REICHMAN

1178

12/22/2009 10:14:45 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[46:4

full policy space in which to maneuver that these conventions
333
actually afford. Conversely, governments that do stand up for
such rights stand a good chance of persuading the WTO
Appellate Body that unilateral actions taken against them
violate fundamental WTO precepts.
Article 23 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) obliges Members to seek redress for alleged violations of the
WTO Agreement, including its TRIPS component, by means of
334
specified multilateral venues and procedures.
Under this
provision, the U.S. authorities can challenge a developing
country’s interpretation of its TRIPS obligations by initiating
litigation before a dispute settlement panel, with a right of appeal
to the WTO Appellate Body. But the USTR cannot unilaterally
adjudicate disputes over matters covered by the TRIPS
Agreement, nor can it legally impose sanctions for the loss of its
335
expected trade benefits. Freedom from unilateral action of this
kind is one major reason that developing countries signed onto the
336
1994 agreement establishing the WTO in the first place.
In 1999, a WTO panel convoked by European Union officials
criticized the United States for unilaterally applying Section 301
to TRIPS-related matters, and it warned that sanctions would be
337
in order if such violations continued in the future. If developed
countries continue to engage in unilateral retaliations of this
sort, they run the further risk of other countervailing measures
that aggrieved countries could invoke:

333.
See Reichman, supra note 140, at 254 (observing that developing countries are
hesitant to employ legitimate legal tools and flexibilities contained in the TRIPS
Agreement when faced with threats of retaliation by powerful countries); Yu, supra note
208, at 350 (discussing Brazil’s request for consultation following a dispute settlement
process with developed countries). But see Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in
WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and
Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 2, at
884, 895–901 (describing impediments), 901–07 (prescribing strategies to overcome them).
334.
DSU, supra note 332, art. 23.1.
335.
The USTR has revoked the GSP privileges against several Latin American countries
in the past (notably Argentina and Brazil), see supra note 328, and it has threatened Thailand
with similar actions. Because GSP concessions are voluntary, and not required under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994), they may normally be revoked at will;
however, revoking GSP privileges as retaliation for a unilaterally determined violation of a
TRIPS obligation would seem to violate both the letter and spirit of Article 23 of the DSU.
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 434
(3d ed. 2005); Abbott & Reichman, supra note 38, at 980.
336.
See UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 4–5, 8, 10,
(2005).
337.
Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). At the time, the USTR promised to exercise its power in
conformity with the DSU.
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Because such action constitutes a violation of the DSU and
of the framework Agreement Establishing the WTO, it
would entitle the aggrieved party to all the remedies that
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for
breach of the relevant agreements. A primary remedy thus
provided is the age-old right of self-help implicit in the
power of an aggrieved party to suspend its obligations
under the treaty in question, pending compensation for
338
breach.

Developing countries that win dispute settlement cases against
developed countries may also invoke cross-collateral trade
sanctions in the event that damages based on sanctions against
imports of knowledge goods alone were insufficient to cover the
actual trade losses caused by the defendant country’s violations
339
of the WTO Agreements.
Those developing countries willing to defend their
interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement before WTO dispute
settlement panels have already made significant contributions to
our understanding of international intellectual property law. For
example, in the very first WTO TRIPS case concerning a dispute
between the United States and the European Union on one side
and India on the other, the Appellate Body, while finding against
India on the merits, rejected the interpretation put forward by
340
the plaintiffs. Instead, the Appellate Body stressed the need for
deference to the manner in which states undertook good faith
implementation of TRIPS obligations within their domestic legal
systems, in keeping with Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement
341
itself.
338.
Reichman, supra note 140, at 259 (footnotes omitted); see Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 (permitting suspension of
treaty obligations when one party materially breaches a multilateral treaty).
339.
See, e.g., UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 336, at 682 (discussing crossretaliation in the form of trade sanctions by suspension of concessions); Henning Grosse
Ruse-Khan, A Pirate of the Caribbean? The Attractions of Suspending TRIPS
Obligations, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313, 316–18 (2008) (recounting a WTO Panel decision
allowing Antigua to request suspension of its TRIPS obligations in response to the
United States’ refusal to comply with a prior DSB order to cease interference with
Antigua’s gambling and betting services); see also Catherine Saez, WTO Ruling on
Brazil-US Cotton Opens Door to Cross-Retaliation Against IP Rights, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH, Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/09/07/wto-ruling-on-brazilcotton-opens-door-to-cross-retaliation-against-ip-rights
(describing
the
DSB’s
authorization of Brazil to take cross-collateral trade sanctions against the United
States for illegal cotton subsidies).
340.
Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶¶ 58, 84, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
341.
Id. ¶¶ 46, 59; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.1 (“Members shall be free
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice.”); see Jerome H. Reichman, Securing
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More recently, in a dispute about the enforcement of
intellectual property rights between China and the United
States, the panel’s decision on the merits went both ways,
342
depending on the specific issues. Nevertheless, as Professor
Dreyfuss points out, the panel gave China “extensive leeway to
determine how to dispose of infringing goods and where to set the
threshold for criminal enforcement,” while stressing that “TRIPS
is a minimum standards regime . . . that gives members freedom
to determine the most appropriate method of implementing their
343
obligations.”
Professor Dreyfuss thus predicts that greater
participation of the emerging countries in the WTO adjudication
process would likely push both panels and the Appellate Body to
more carefully scrutinize the balancing factors favoring
developing country interests that are already built into the
TRIPS Agreement than has so far occurred in cases where the
344
only antagonists are developed country Members.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
While much of the recent literature continues to focus on two
fundamental tenets of the high-protectionist rhetoric, namely
that stronger IPRs necessarily lead to more innovation and more
transfer of technology and that they are essential for attracting
345
FDI,
other studies have demonstrated that technology
exporters need access to emerging Asian and Latin American
markets as much as these countries need FDI, licensing, and up
346
to date high-tech goods. So long as the general level of IP
protection in emerging markets affords technology exporters the
Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v India, 1 J. INT’L ECON. L. 585, 596
(1998) (“Deference to local law and strict construction of treaties have thus become the
pedestal on which the Appellate Body’s TRIPS jurisprudence rests.”); see also Dreyfuss,
supra note 3, at 15–16.
342.
Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights, ¶¶ 8.1–.4, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China
Enforcement of IP].
343.
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 16; see China Enforcement of IP, supra note 342,
¶ 7.236.
344.
Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 17.
345.
See CHEUNG, supra note 277, at 8; Gervais, supra note 5, at 2371–72; Yu, supra
note 8, at 176–78; supra note 21 and accompanying text.
346.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 47, 49 (2000) (asserting that foreign brand owners invest in China’s
economy, in part due to the market for counterfeit products); Yu, supra note 8, at 175, 180
(arguing that foreign investors are attracted to China because of low production costs and
market potential). See generally Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights
in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 109 (1998) (noting the large amount of foreign investment in Latin American
countries, in part due to tax and operating advantages).
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minimum standards and entrepreneurial options available under
the TRIPS Agreement, these exporters will find ways to reach
attractive markets, and would-be purchasers in developing
countries can usually meet their needs through sound
procurement strategies.
Specific bottlenecks are more likely to arise from refusals
to deal, excessive pricing, territorial restraints on outputs, and
other restrictive business practices that suitable competition
laws and policies could help to resolve than from gaps or
347
inadequacies in local intellectual property laws. Even so, the
weak enforcement of IP laws may have detrimental effects on
348
both local and foreign producers.
Meanwhile, innovative
firms benefiting from a pro-competitive environment in
developing countries can also profit from high-protectionist IP
regimes abroad—under the independence of patents
349
doctrine —without aping the protectionist excesses of those
regimes.
As Keith Maskus has explained, IP regimes are but one
component of a healthy development-oriented economy. Without
an appropriate infrastructure that includes corporate law,
bankruptcy law, and a solid educational system, among other
variables, IP protection may add little to either FDI or economic
350
growth in its own right. Moreover, as the relations between
IPRs and innovation in knowledge economies become better
scrutinized, the proper role of IPRs as such in overall
development policies remains far less clear and more complex
351
than the IP literature normally recognizes.
Policies favoring the formation of scientific research
commons, as well as open access to knowledge initiatives, may
become as important in the BRIC countries, especially for
sustainable upstream knowledge outputs, as strategic reliance
on exclusive rights to stimulate downstream commercial

347.
See supra notes 239–43, 253–54 and accompanying text.
348.
See, e.g., CHEUNG, supra note 277, at 26, 31; Chow, supra note 346, at 51.
349.
See Paris Convention, supra note 88, art. 4bis (“Patents applied for . . . shall be
independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether
members of the Union or not.”); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 2.1 (incorporating
substantive provisions of the Paris Convention).
350.
MASKUS, supra note 1, at 200–03.
351.
See, e.g., Margaret Chon, Substantive Equality in International Intellectual
Property Norm Setting and Interpretation, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 8, at 475, 488–91 (“[L]ittle . . . reflection takes place within
intellectual property about its relationship to development law . . . . [T]he international
intellectual property framework must begin to incorporate the alternate model of
development as freedom.”); Stiglitz, supra note 234, at 318–19.
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352

applications of basic research. Unless these countries actively
adapt the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities to their own
development needs, with a view to maximizing the benefits and
minimizing the social costs of harmonized international IP
353
standards,
they may end up “financing not just or even
primarily their own growth, but promoting the economic growth
of developed countries, possibly to the detriment of their own
354
economic development.”
Against this background, the high- and middle-income
developing countries, as a group, are well positioned to undertake
a leadership role in adapting traditional intellectual property law
to the new technological conditions and challenges that the
355
OECD countries have increasingly failed to address. To the
extent that these emerging economies avoid the pitfalls that have
begun to undermine markets for technology in the United States
and the European Union, fashioning a more flexible, balanced,
and modern approach to intellectual property law could in fact
enable them to boost their growing comparative advantages in
356
cutting-edge technologies well beyond current levels.
To
achieve this result, however, will require developing country
governments to self-consciously adopt disciplined legal and
political strategies that preserve the policy space in which to
devise and test their own intellectual property institutions and to
stimulate a vigorous and concerted debate about the proper
357
design of those same institutions.

352.
See, e.g., Allarakhia, supra note 178, at 12; Hope, supra note 153, at 186–87;
Octaviani, supra note 178, at 133 (predicting downstream research benefits of
collaborative and open practices in biotechnology); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 177, at
11 (“[G]overnment agencies will have to find ways of coping with bilateral data exchanges
with other countries that exercise intellectual property rights in their own data
collections.”). See generally BENKLER, supra note 176, at 130–31 (emphasizing the
importance of networked information on economic opportunity and access to knowledge
for both advanced and developing economies).
353.
See Reichman, supra note 43, at 28 (noting the “wiggle room” that the TRIPS
Agreement gives to developing countries in implementing intellectual property policies).
354.
See Ostergard, Jr., supra note 13, at 155.
355.
See Dreyfuss, supra note 3, at 2–3 (referring to India, Brazil, and China as the
“emerging Middle” countries positioned to “move into a leadership position in establishing
new practices”).
356.
Translating nascent technical advantages into competitive advantages on world
markets is said to be an explicit goal of the Chinese Patent Law (as amended 2008). Feng,
supra note 9, at 6–9.
357.
See, e.g., Pedro Nicolletti Mizukami et al., Exceptions and Limitations to
Copyright in Brazil: A Call for Reform, in A CCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN B RAZIL, supra
note 33, at 67, 114 (concluding that Brazilian citizens must address the “inadequate
state of the law” in order to deal with both copyright infringement problems and
users’ rights).
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Legal circles in the emerging economies will also have to
study and master the relevant WTO jurisprudence, as the
358
Japanese did at an earlier period, in order to steer clear of
obvious legal obstacles and to defend national autonomy at the
TRIPS Council or, when necessary, in actual dispute settlement
cases. These countries should also avoid further multilateral and
bilateral standard-setting negotiations likely to limit their own
autonomy and governance capacities, while at the same time
seeking to forge regional understandings on these same issues
359
that could attenuate the pressures from abroad. Above all, most
developing countries still need to establish solid interagency
review mechanisms that can exercise oversight of their
intellectual property bureaus and ensure that the latter properly
implement national innovation policies established at the highest
360
levels of government.
From a broader perspective, any uniquely developing
country effort to fashion appropriate intellectual property
regimes for the twenty-first century must necessarily seek a new
equilibrium between public and private goods. Because the last
half of the twentieth century was so consumed with conflicts
between public-centered and private-centered economies,
insufficient thought was given to evaluating the proper and everevolving interrelationship between private and public goods,
which the rise of knowledge economies has made so critically
361
important. In this context, Joseph Stiglitz’s call to recognize the
362
role of “knowledge as a global public good” has generated an
important literature whose practical implementation should
become a primary goal of forward-looking policymakers in all
363
developing countries.
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These countries should also build ever stronger
connections to the worldwide flow of scientific and technical
information, a task that will require sharing locally generated
scientific data with the rest of the world (as China has begun
364
to do),
while resisting legal, economic, and technological
365
restraints on the dissemination of such data. A particularly
forward-looking policy would, for example, lead developing
countries to support open access and other sharing
366
mechanisms at the level of scientific enquiry, while taking
steps to better ensure downstream support for innovative
applications flowing from cooperative public–private upstream
research initiatives.
If, at the end of the twentieth century, we learned that
access to knowledge was as important for economic growth and
human welfare as stimulating investment in the production of
knowledge goods, it could be the developing countries as a group
that lead us out of certain blind alleys that currently pit these
two essential policy goals against one another. It is, as
Professor Dreyfuss and I have recently argued, precisely a
time for experimentation, and not a time to copy or codify
obsolete approaches that are likely to boomerang against the
long-term interests of the very developed countries that are
most avidly pushing the harmonization buttons at the
367
international level.
To be sure, charting one’s own course is never easy,
especially when powerful countries and knowledge cartels apply
countervailing pressures at every step. Nevertheless, I continue
to believe that, with enlightened leadership, buttressed by
“skillful lawyering, political determination and coordinated
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Knowledge-Sharing Institutions at Turin University (June 30, 2009) (overviewing the
models needed to utilize the data generated by worldwide research); Mizukami &
Lemos, supra note 33, at 50–52 (suggesting that legal scholarship will be important to
prepare lawmakers and enforcers “in mapping the territory of possible interactions
between copyright law and other fields of the law, to provide solutions for potential
controversies”).
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planning,” the intellectual property institutions inherited from
the Industrial Revolution can evolve into a worldwide system of
innovation that will benefit countries at every stage of economic
development.

368.
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